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ABSTRACT 
The foHowing thesis presents an analysis of business-government relations 
within a neo-Marxist framework. SpedficaUy, the discussion encompasses how the 
business interest group. the Business Council on National Issues, maintains consensus 
and unity amongst its monopoly capital members. Furthermore. the study elaborates on 
the process through which the group's interests are acknowledged and legitimized by 
the state under the "public interest" f8fue. 
Most of the literature pertaining to business-government relations within the 
context of interactions between business interest groups and the state, and such 
specific branches of the state as the government andlor the civil service. emphasize a 
liberal-pluralist perspective. Essentially, these writings serve to reflect and legitimate 
the current slalus quo. Manist discourses on the subject, while attempting to 
transcend the liberal-pluralist f.ramework. nevertheless suffer f.rom either economic 
determinism .. Le., stressing the state's accumulation function but not its legitimation 
function or historical specificity. A cogent and comprehensive neo-Marxist analysis of 
business-government relations must discuss both the accumulation and legitimation 
functions of the state. The process by which the concerns of a particular business 
interest group become part of the state's policy agenda and subsequently are 
formulated and implemented into policies which legitimate its dominance is also 
studied. This inquiry is significant given the liberal-pluralist assumptions of a neutral 
state and that all interest groups compete "on a level playing field". 
The author's neo-Marxist paradigm rejects both of these assumptions. Building 
on concepts from nea-Marxist instrumentalism. structuralism. state monopoly 
capitalism, and forms and functions of the state perspectives. the author proposes that 
policies which legitimize the interests of the monopoly capital fraction cannot. be 
discerned only from the state's activities. per StJ. Clearly, if the liberal-pluralist 
3 
contention of multiple and conflicting interest groups, including those within the 
capitalist class, is taken at face value, M interest group such as the Business Council on 
National Issues (BCND, must somehow maintain. internal consensus Md unity amongst 
its members. Internal consensus amongst its members ensures that the state can better 
acknowledge and articulate its concerns into policies that maintain hegemonic 
dominance of the monopoly capital fraction under the "public interest" fllf.JJdq. The 
author contends that the BCNI focuses most of its interactions on the upper echelons of 
the civil service since it is this branch of the state which is most responsible for policy 
formulation and implementation. 
The author's paradigm is applied within the context of extensively analyzing 
newspaper coverage. BCN! publications, and other published sources, as well as a 
personal interview with an executive administrative member of the BeNI. The 
discussion focuses on how agreement and unity amongst the various interests of the 
monopoly capital fraction are maintained through the business organization, its policy 
scope, and finally its interactions with the state. 
The analysis suggests that while the civil service is an important player in 
expressing the interests of the BCNI's membership through policies which ostensibly 
also reflect the "public interest", it is not the only strategic target for the BCNI's 
interactions with the state. The author's research also highlights the importance of 
government officials at the Cabinet level and Cabinet Committees. Senior elected 
officials from the Federal government are also significant in avoiding 
intergovernmental or interprovincial conflict in implementing policies that legitimize 
hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction over other fractions and 
dasses. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Council on National Issue, (BCND ud the Canadian Federal civil service came from the 
following two sources. First. it. is based on the realization that. the subject of business~ 
8overnment. relations from a Manist. or a ne~.MarJist. perspective is a sadly neglected 
part of current public administration literature. For example, "public choice" vriter, 
Y.T. StanbUry, in the book. BusJ165S-tJowrD.IJltlJlt RtlllltioDs in CIuJ_, acknO'Wledles 
the Manist. W'lument.. but only in terms of making business interest groups" pay" for 
their dominance over labour) Business ad Politics. A Study of Collec/iYe Ar:tioJ1 , 
written by William Coleman. from a liberal-pluralist perspective, questions the 
cogency of Marlism by presentin8 only fragments of Manlst ualysis out of contelt.2 
Secondly, after reading and analyzing the very few works written on the BCN! 
and the Canadian state, one gets the im.pression that t.he propositions are bued on 
revisionist or historical specific concepts. This is perhaps most acute in the article, 
"The Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian State" by David LangiUe.3 
While offednl many useful insights, Langille's contention that. "the BeNI is an 
alliance of monopoly capital under the leadership of the hegemonic fraction--finance 
capital. led by the chartered banks"4 tends to be somewhat arbitrary and limited. 
especialty if it is considered in context of the other interests of the monopoly capital 
fraction such u ma.nufacturinl, resources, or foreiln investment. When LanaiUe 
attempts to analyze specific polities such as the Post. National EnerlY Prolramme, he 
contends: 
"The direction which their compromises [i,e., between producing and 
consumwi sectors, and between the Federal and Provincial 
10vernmentsJ have taken sUIleMs that tile staples fn.ctioD.--th.e 
al1iaace 1».ty... fi.a.aaee ca,ital Aad resource ca,ital--stiU 
.utweishs th.e inlla •• ce 01 .a.alactudal ca.pital. "5 
Unfortunately, this assumption is founded upon the revisionist "dependency 
school" of theorists. Kari Levitt. writblg from a neo-Marxist perspective based her 
"dependency" analysis on a somewhat narrow interpretation of Harold Innis' "staples 
theory" ,6 Moreover, the entire "dependency school" is bound to historical specificity 
and rather archaic. liven WilHam Carroll's later analysis that most. of the previou~dy 
toreiln-owned and controlled staples interests of monopoly capital in Canada have 
been repatriated by u alliance of Canadian finucial and industrial interests.7 
Furthermore, Langille does not explain how the business interest group u an 
orlanaation ensures cohesion and (:onsensusamon, its memben' interests. Too often. 
Langille's analysis concentrates on the state's accumulation function at the expense of 
ne,lectin, the state's lel1Umwon function. In other words, how is the ",etleral 
business interest" made synonymous with the "public interest"? Perhaps this is 
because Langille sees the BeNI's policy initiatives from strictly an economically 
deterministic perspective. 
Finally, in discussinl the BeNI's composition of membership, wgiUe notes the 
following: 
" ... the BeNt may constitute the most powerful basUon of patriarchy in 
the country. ,iven that aU one hundred and fifty of the chief executives 
involved are men" .8 
AUhou,h this is a. perceptive point on Lan,iUe's part. it also conwns an unintentional 
irony. Regardless of Langille's neo-MarIist perspective, his analysis is merely another 
addition to the "powerful bastion II of male-dominated business-government relations 
writers. The author concedes that some may find this point to be semantic or even 
irrelevant. However. one is hard pressed to find the same number of female writers 
publishing material on the interactions between business interest groups andth. ,tate. 
Furthermore. the author does not desire or expect to have the material cOJUained 
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within this thesis considered Promet11elUl by those who read it. For example. the 
foUowina material is esssntiaUy a summary aad aadysis of LaagiUe's artide. Rather, 
the point is beina emphasized as a humble attempt on the a.uthor's part to encourale 
further research on the subject by other women public administration students aad/or 
professors. The rest of this introduction provides a brief synopsis of each of the thesis 
chapters. 
If one is to underta..ke critical study of the subject of business-government 
retations from a Marxist perspective. the first task to be a.c.:complished is to survey the 
various contendinl views elisting in the literature. 'lith this mind. Chapters Two aad 
Three are devoted to examining business-government. .relations in the context of 
several theories. The basic framework of each chapter is the same. It e:ummes the 
roles of both the civil service and business interest group(s) in terms of articulating 
the "public interest". The state's telitima.tion function is aaaJyzed in the context of 
maintaining the sllIIus IlUtJ. It is therefore also important to discuss the state's 
neutraUty (or lack thereof> in the process. Each theory is also analyzed in terms of 
presentinl a valid and aU encompassinl paradigm. of busmess-Iovernment relations. 
Cha.pter Two deals with such "traditional" paradigms as elitism. pluralism, pubUc 
choice. corporatism. aad instrumental. Marxism.. AU of these paradigms are discovered 
to have several conceptual problems. 
Chapter Three surveys and examines business-government relations in terms of 
certain neo-Mu:dst aad post neo-Muxist paradigms. The neo-Marxist paradigms 
analyzed include: Ralph MiUba.nd·s instrumentalism. Antonio Gramsd's relative 
autonomy of the state a.nd hegemony, structuralism. a.nd state monopoly c;apit.a.tism. The 
post neo-Mar:xist section examines the form and functions of the state a.nd Bob Jessop's 
synthesis of various neo-Marxist paradilmB. BuUdins upon Jessop's emphasis for the 
need to integrate various neo-Marxist paradigms. the author's th80retical framework of 
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business-govertuneni relations combiJles specific elements of the fore-mentioned 
theories. 
EssentiaJly, the author ugues that. if one wishes to comprehend how the 
concerns of a business interest smup a.re translated into the "public interest", one 
must e:mmlo.e .ho ... the organization maintains cohesion and ag.reement. The ability of 
the organization to achieve this ensu.res putially that. its constituency, In this cue, 
monopoly capital interests in Canada, is able to maintain hegemonic domlnance r-is-8.-
r-is other fractions and dasses. Internat unity and consensus aJ.so explains how the 
group's policy concerns a..re presented to either the aovernment and lor the civil 
service. The author also contends that a business interest sroup such as the BeNl must 
be interpreted as a "parallel bu.reaucracy" r-is-lJ,-r-is the civil service. Both attempt to 
.blitiate and legitimize policies that perpetuate accumulation under the "public 
interest" I'~ of being responsive to vuious, sometimes conflicting concerns a.o.d 
seekin, consensus. The BeNI's policy initiatives to the state a..re synonymous to 
influencing the luger nationat poUcy a,en •. 
Chapters Four. Five and Six. essentially "&pply" the author's paradism of 
business-government rela.tions to the intera.ctions between the business interest group 
and the civil service. Much of the analysis contained in these three chapters is based 
on wgiUe's utide as well as the author's interviews with Jock A. Finlayson. Vi,,-
P.resident in chuS' of PoUcy and Reseuch, Business Coundl on National Issues, 
conducted at. the BeNI's Ottawa "head office" in August 1990. Chapter Four discusses the 
origins. structure and interna.1 opera.tions of th, Business Council on Na.tiona.1 Issues. 
lb., analysis "eveats that the Business Council is what. is referred in the literature as u 
"institutionalized" interest group.9 It is able to communica.te and legitimate members' 
concerns under the auspices of cohesion and consensus. Furthermore, the 
organization functions to legitimate state policies to those monopoly capita.! interests 
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that may be adversely affected, in terms of promoting the "general business in terest" # 
just. as the civil service acts as a form of damage control. legitimizing policies to avoid 
fra.ctional and class conflIct for the benefit of the "public interest" . 
The introduction of Cha.pter Five reCers to G.ramsci's concept of hegemony and 
Jessop's hegemonic project. Both offer means by which the state can fUDction to 
perpetua.te accumulation for the capitalist dass while also performi.ng the appare.ntly 
contradictory fu.o.ction of legitimwng these policies to the subordinate working class, 
These t.wo seemingly contradictory purposes are unified by the state's ability to appear 
responsive to "popular interests" through particular hegemooJ.c projects. Examples of 
hegemonic projects within the Canadian context include the "Free Trade Agreement", 
the "Goods and Services Tu", the "Meech Lake Accord", and the proposed 
w:vlronmentaJ Protection Policy. Jessop argues that hegemonic: projects try to bring 
about agreement betweeD different and co.nflicti.ng specific a.nd gene.raJ interests. The 
author maintains that hegemonic projects functio.n to uphold the lonl term interests of 
accumulation and domi.nance for the monopoly capital fraction. within the context of 
state monopoly capitalism. However. the hegemonic project can also be analyzed as a 
method of achievin, con.sensus and cohesion amon.gst the interests of monopoly capital 
themselves. The chapter discusses how the previously mentioned hegemonic projects 
maintain and perpetuate the sll/l.us fUO for BeNI members. These poUcies are also 
~ilaificaot fa tha.t they help to darify the ambiguity surrouading bow the "business 
interest" is made syaoaymous with the "public laterest". 
Fiaally, Chapter Six discusses the author's !1eo~Marxist puadigm of business-
lovernment relations with specific reference to the in.teractio.D.s between. the civil 
service and the BeN!. The majority of neo-Muxist writings on the state's functions 
assert that the state is a means of creating a common bond bet.ween key fractions of 
capital. In other words, the state's formulation and implementation of poUdes 
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conducive to accumulation ensures hegemonic domiJ1ance of the monopoly capital 
fraction. However. the author argues that the fUJ1ctioJlS previously ascribed to the 
state can also be undertaken by a. "parallel bU1"eaucra.cy" such as the Business Council. 
This suggests the BeN! can be seen as a "semi-state" organaation with 1"espect to its 
Cu.o.ctions of promoting policies which i.o.stil a. se.o.se of qreeme.o.! a.o.d u.o.ity amonast 
its members as weU as mal.o.wning hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital 
fraction. The BeNI occupies a position somewhere between civil society and the state u 
it is usually conceptualized in neo-Marxist litenture. 
The chapter continues to discuss how the BCNI membership's concerns for 
accumulatioB and hegemoBic domi.o.ance of the monopoly capital fraction are 
actualb:ed within the context of the policy process. Generally, the author's paradigm is 
supported by the contents of the interviews with Finlayson. There are, however. two 
important amendments to the author's preliminary neo-Manist business-government 
relations paradigm. The first revision made to the original model is to iBdude the 
Privy CouBci! Office. comprised of senior civil servants, as a major force iB policy 
formulatioa, and. therefore. an intelral part of the BeN!'s communicatioB "network" 
with the Canadian state. 
The second chanle in the a.uthor's originally presented paradigm is evidence 
suggesting direct interaction between the BeNI and the Federal Cabinet. The analysis 
serves to explain how monopoly ca.pita.! interests an acknowledged by the Federal 
lovernment's influential Priorities u.d Planning Committee. The legitimation 
function of Ottawa. particularly in terms of pollcy implementation, can be extended to 
resolving intergovernm.ental or interprovincial conructs. thereby bringing about 
consensus for polides that reflect the interests of the monopoly ca.pita.! fraction. 
Again. this discussion illustrates how the "general business interest" is equated with 
the "public interest" . 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY I 
The following chapter briefly summarizes c::ontendinl views of business-
government relations in the context of the Elitist, Pluralist, Public Choice, Corporatist, 
and Instrumental Marxist paradigms. The roles of the civil service and business 
interest Iroup(s) will be examined ill articulating the "public interest". Within 
capitalist society, the framework throulh which these paradigms are presented, the 
public interest is SYllonymous to accumulation by the dominant economic group and 
legitimation. The state, through its activities, formulates and implements policies into 
rules or laws which facilitate greater profits for capitalists, while maintaining 
consensus among conflicting classes. The state's legitimation role includes 
estabUshing and perpetuating the slMlIS flit). Accordingly, the state's neutrality (or 
lack thereof) in the process will also be considered. Finally I each paradigm is critically 
evaluated in terms of being a cogent and comprehensive framework for the analysis of 
business--government relations. 
ELITISM 
This paradigm begins with the proposition that. there are t'Wo major lroups in 
society: the elites and the muses.l The elites comprise a minority of society's 
members, but mate all crucial political decisions for the muses. Consequently, the 
elites can be seen as nding over thfll majority. The paradigm further assumes that 
. large, complex oraanizations are inherent in almost every facet of modern society.2 
What special characteristics do these organizations possess 'Which provide members of 
the eUte with such a potential source of power? Accordinl to Gaetano Mosca, the 
control an elite exerts 1s dependent upon its ability to coalesce into a cohesive force.3 
Similarly, Robert Michels contends that the elite's ability to tcmtrol depends on its 
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organizational prowess -- hente, his famous political creed: "Who says organization 
says oligarchy" ,4 
Therefore, such factors as expertise, hierarchical control, and the capability to 
distribute hum.an, technological, and material resources allocate power to bureaucratic 
elite members.S What is crucial to note at this point is that the fore-mentioned pre-
requisites for elite control can also be used by organizations external to the state. For 
example, if an interest group, such as the Business Council on National Issues, is to 
interact effectively with the Federal civil cervice, it must become a "paraUel 
bureaucracy" in terms of knowledge, resources, cohesiveness, and control. The 
interaction between Federal Public Servants and the Business Council on National 
Issues wiUbe to maintain and perpetuate the slmllS quo for their particular elites in 
capitalism. Consequently, both groups have a common goal: creating a specific "public 
interest" in which their elite dominance is maintained at the masses' expense. The 
state, insofar as it is identified with the civil service. is not neutral in the elitist 
s(,~eJ1lU"io. The question that begs to be asked is: what is the structure of the state which 
facilitates elite interaction and a bias in defining the "public interest"? Within the 
elitist paradigm. the structure of the state is comprised of a group of large-scale 
organizations. each based on a separate institutional sector,6 These elites manipulate 
the political base, although it is unclear through what specific means this control is 
achieved a,nd maintained. 
There 3.1'13 several other conceptual problems which render the elitist paradigm 
as insufficient in. explainin.g business-government relations. For example, elitism 
tends to ignore the uneven amounts of power held by different bureaucratic 
organizations.? This problem can be applied to various business interest organizations 
such as the Business Council on National Issues vis-d.-vis the grass-roots-oriented 
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Canadian Federation of Independent Business. It can a.1so be used to eva.1uate the 
relative sources of power among the state's bureaucratic organizations. The mandate of 
most business interest groups is to facilitate capitaJ accumulation and, consequently, 
members will interact with such state bureaucratic orsanizations as the Treasury 
Board. Energy Mines. and Resources. or Finance more frequently than the Ministry of 
State for Multicultura.1ism. This bureaucratic organization is more suited towards $Odd 
cohesion than capitalist accumulation. 
The elitist paradigm considers the state as a monolithic power bloc. whose elite 
members share the common goa! of capitaJ accumulation. There is no indication of a 
conflicting dichotomy between those bureaucratic organizations within the state 
concerned with capital accumulation ViN-vis legitimation and socia.! cohesion. It is 
only the public choice paradigm which acknowledges this spUt among the state 
bureaucratic eUte. Furthermore, how are the mutual interests of a business pressure 
group and the civil service justified in terms of "the public interest"? The paradigm 
depends too heavily on eUte maintenance. whith in a. capitalist system would be 
equated with actumulation. without taking woo account hoy the state's form and 
function legitimate elite interests. 
Another shortcoming of elitism with reference to the interaction between 
business interest groups and the civil service is that it fails to expla.in adequately, or 
even take into account, the existence of counter-eUtes. In this context. counter-elites 
refer 00 such groups within the bourgeois class as monopoly and non-monopoly capital. 
How does the state acknowledge which interest.(s) among these competing and 
conflicting groups wiU be dominant? Finally. the fo"~mentioned eUte analysis 
assumes that bureaucratic organizations predominate over political ones within the 
state. How is this possible since political parUes are considered eUtes also? The anNe!' 
Ues in the bureaucratic eUte's monopoly on. expert knowledge with reference to the 
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policy process, the permanent status they enjoy yjs-a.-yjs politicians, and, a sense of 
non-partisanship which enables the civil service to articulate "the public interest". It 
is also precisely for these reasons that the Business Council on National Issues is most 
likely to interact with senior members of the Federal civil service. 
PLURALISM 
Unlike elitism., pluralism is based on the assumption that society is composed of a 
myriad of interest groups, each competing with one another to have its needs 
translated into public policy by the state.a Power, in the form of expertise, human. 
technological, and material resources is distributed among the interest groups, 
including those of business. Given the emphasis on competition and dispersed power. 
the pluralist paradigm suggests a constantly cha.n.ging environment in which interest 
group success depends on the salience of the single issue being advocated, the level of 
organization, and playing by the "rules of the game". In the universe of business 
interest groups, one of the cardinal rules of the game is: "Thou shaH promote only 
those issues which support the capitalist slmus I/UO of accumulation a.n.d bourgeois 
domination." For weak: or poorly organized interest groups, power is exercised only 
through the mechanism of voting. 
The state's primary function within the pluralist paradigm is to bring about 
"consensus" and social order through the on-going bargaining process of interest 
group demands and government responses.9 The role of the state, and. by extension, 
the civil service, is that of a neutral arbiter among competing interest groups. 
Business interests do not form a cohesive, unified organization as in the elitist 
paradigm. Rather, they are divided into various competing interests such as .resources. 
ma.n.ufacturing, financial, and foreign business orga.n.izations that compete with other 
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.rou9S in society. The result of the interest group struggles within plunUsm will be 
policy formulated a..D.d implemented by the state which reflects the "public i.nterest", IS 
elpressed through the democra.tic process. 
The fore-mentioned pluralist description of interest group comgeUtion in 
articulating the 9ubUc good through the auspices of a neutral state leaves much to be 
desired. Contrary to the pluralist contention of equaUy competing interest groups, 
there is a..D. imbda..D.ce of power for those orla..D.izations which ha.ve a larler vested 
interest in the state's policy formulation and implementa.tion. For elample, in a 
capitalist system, business interest Iroup' have the organization and resources to 
effect the shape a..D.d outcome of sta.te policy since capital accumulation a..D.d legitimation 
of the pluralist system is what their dominance depends upon. The lack of a cohesive 
business or,a..D..wwon. as found in the elitist paradism. however, means that the 
interaction between the sta.te a..D.d interest Iroups will produce incremental and sinlle-
issue poUcies. The sta.te's role IS a neutral arbiter is also highly contentious within 
plunJism. One wonders at the type of consensus or "c::ommoll lood" a. state within 
pluralism articulates if orga..D.iza.tion is equated with power, ud both seem to be held 
exclusively by either public or private bureaucracies. Clearly, within the pluraUst 
paradilm. effectiveness is homologous to orluization. The needs of organ.ized interest 
groups, especially those of business, not the unorganized masses, wiU comprise the 
"public interest". 
W iUiam Colemaa a..D.al~s polity networks between business orgaa.wwons and 
the state under such conceptual labels as "pressure pluralism", "co-optive pluralism", 
a..D.d "clientele pluralism ",10 He argues eloquently that the structure of a given policy 
network, will vary according to such factors as otlaSlization of the state, organization of 
business. distance between business and the state, and the relationship between 
associations and their members. Unfortunately. his a..D.a1ysis latks comprehensiveness 
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od cogency since it fails to take 111to account or explain how or why certain issues are 
formaUy recognized in the pluralist agenda-setting process. 
What Colemo od others fail to address is what is referred to by Petet Bachrach 
and Morton S. Ba.ratz as "non-decision making" .11 Non-decision makinl attempts to 
explain why specific issues are excluded from the asenda-settin.1 process within. the 
pluralist framework. The rules of the game, mentioned previously, by which aU 
interest Iroups mutually abide. osten.sibiy eAlute con.sensus a.nd an equilibrium of 
power. Only those issues that main.WA od perpetuate the current. slMlIs I'/UO for 
organized dominant stoups will be considered by the neutral state. This implies that 0 
interest group, such as the Business Council on National Issues. because of its 
organ.Dtion. 's mandate. is more Ukely to have its poUey initiatives considered and 
implemeated by the state, than oother faction which calls for the systematic 
dismantling of the entire capitalist system. Furthermore, non-decision making draws 
attention to the fallacy contained within the pluralist paradiam that all interest groups 
have equal opportunities and .resources in the decision-making process. It hu also 
been correctly pointed out. that the term "non-dech~ion " is a misnomer since. in this 
context. the term can describe issues that the state has decided to suppress or not 
acknowledge. However, the concept remains a powerful and cogent argument which 
pierces the p1ura115t f6pK/e of equal competition among all interest Iroups. and of a 
neutral state. 
PUBLIC CHOICE PARADIGM 
This paradigm, Uke pluralism. is founded upon the concept. of competition. The 
difference between pluralism and public choice is that the latter stresses the 
maximization ot individual. not gtoup. utility. 12 There are two fundamental constraints 
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under which an interest group such as the Business Council on National Issues aSld the 
Civil Service must interact withw. the public choice system. 13 The first constraint is 
that any policy formulated and implemented by the state will reflect the needs of only 
certain interests. Hence. state polity is inherently coercive since one interest. group 
will benefit at the cost of another. Even though aU interest groups compete to have 
their concerns placed on the state's policy asenda, the winners of this process 'NUl 
make up only a select. minority of the "gene.ra1 public", The public choice paradigm 
assumes that. the decisions urived through this proce" wiU reflect the needs of the 
pubUc. Accordingly. the second const..raint placed on the public choice system is that 
the policy-making process involves establishing a consensus among conflicting 
interests. 
There ue t.wo important questions to consider when examining the .role of 
interest groups within the public choice pandigm. 14 The first question is concerned 
with the conditions under which interest groups form and survive. In the pubUc 
choice system, the individual calculates the costs and benefits of acUnl in a coUecUve 
organization. If these benefits are higher throuah the organJza.Uon's activities, the 
individual perceives it is therefore more effident, Md rational to engase in this type 
ot interest articulation. It is important to qualify the rationality of the group's activity, 
in that eaeh member must pay the same costs u well as receive equal benefits to avoid 
the "free dder" problem. The free rider problem occurs when certain members of the 
interest group organization receive the same benefits IS others without havina 
incurred the costs. The most efficient way to avoid this problem is to torm a small and 
cohesive interest aroup that organizes and utilizes its coUett!ve resources equaUy 
among all its members. This logic is reflective of the interest group's organization 
within the eliUst paradilm. The membership of the Business Council on National Issues 
includes the elite or teadina corporations in resources, manufacturing. and finance ,15 
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The second questioA lAvolves the specific means through which interest groups 
exert their influence. The first mechanism used by interest sroups is to alert the 
voter's attention for or qainst a. particular policy through the media. This may serve 
as a buttress 1.0. providing a. sense of lelitimation for the interest group's concern 
without having to extend the immediate lains to the masses. Consequently, members of 
the interest group nap the be£lefits of pubUc support whUe simultaneously shiNn, 
the cost onto the masses. Secondly. interest ,roups provide industry expertise 
(although it may be cO£ltentious or biased) to the state's decision-maters. usually 
Ministers or senior bureaucrats. The logic of this a.ctivity is the interest group's hope 
that poUtidans and dvil servants wiU formulate and Implement poUcies that. tate into 
acCOU£lt the orlu.ization's needs. 0.0. other occasions. special interest groups possess 
informatlo.o. that officials with policy advisory responsibilities require.l6 The 
symbiotic relationship involves the interest group tryi£lg to convince the officials of 
the validity of its cause in the hope tha.t this wiU have a positive influence on the 
policy advice put forward by officials. Thirdly. reciprocit.y ma.y be offered to 
politicians ud/or bureaucrats for an advutaseous decision relardIn, the interest 
,roup's concern(s), or withdrawi.n, its 'pedal privileges. The interest Iroup may 
accommodate the government by promisin, electoral support. or providinl financial 
assistance to the political parties. These two sources of support can be interpreted as 
interest lroups, including business, mating optimal use of their resources and 
interaction 'With the state. In this insUt£lce. politicians ud bureaucrats wiU be used to 
initiate and influence policy formulation and output to serve the needs of business. 
These needs involve capit.a.1 accumulation and legitimation. yet they cu abo be sources 
of conflict within the state, as will be discussed later. Fina.11y. interest Iroulls 
participate in the regulatory proceedinls of the state. 
Along with the competitio.n among individual ud, not, Iroup interests. the 
25 
public choice paradigm differs radicaUy from the pluralist assumption of the state 
being neutral. Capitalism. u defined by the pursuit of self-interest is not limited to 
interest sroups, but involves such actors u politicians and bureaucrats. Politicians, for 
example, use voter muimizatio.n and expediency i.n the pollCY process to obwn and 
mainw.n positions of power. prestiae, and status. Two of the methods by which these 
political ends can be a.chieved are through the reciprocal activities. mentio.ned in the 
previous paragraph. that elected officials and i.nterest groups e.ngale l.n. 
Bureaucrats use power and k.nowledge regarding the policy process to 
perpetuate their own self-i.nterests 1.n terms of empire-building. Empire-buHdinl. u 
an expression of pursuing seIC-interest. can lead to a conflicting dichotomy between 
bureaucrats seeki.ng muimiution of self-interests through capital accumulation roles 
and those in departments with legitimation and social cohesion fu.nctio.ns. The state is 
not a cohesive. unified structure u in the elitist paraliilm. There are two major 
consequences of this division. First. how does the civil service fuUlU its function of 
articulati.ng and mainwnin8 the "public i.nterest" throulh its policies, given that 
individual departments within the state focus their resources toward capital 
accumulation or legitimiutio.n ud social cohesion. but not both. This is particularly 
crucial since it is precisely the delicate balance of a.ccumula.Uon a.nd legitimation that 
business i.nterest groups viU expect the state to embody in its "public i.nterest: The 
'public interest "1'~ must. be used o.n the muses and rival i.nterest groups to justify 
the dominmt i.nterest group's heilemony. Hereia Hes o.ne of the problems with the 
public choice paradigm. Si.nce different interest groups md individuals have 
divet'lent md possibly co.nfUcti.n1 i.nterests. who wiU eventuaUy achieve 
domi.nmce 711 What are the 81em, by which wi.nner, and losers are articulated o.n a 
specific issue? This problem is exacerbated i.n the public choice paradigm since .not 
even the state is a neutral arbiter between competi.nl interests. 
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Another fundamental problem with the public choice paradigm is the over-
emphuis of efficiency a.nd .rationality u hotll a means and an end in upholding the 
public interest.. 1 a If the public interest. translates into maintaining the sllltlJs ,uo 
towards capital accumulatio.o.. then public policy can be both efficient and effective. 
But how does o.o.e apply efficiency to the legitimation and social cohesion function of 
public poUcy. without possibly resortina to overt state coercion? Clearly. both capital 
accumulation and legitimation are equaUy integrai parts of the"publlc interest~ The 
pursuit of seU-interest that the public choice paradigm supports compromises not only 
the state but business organizations' efforts in reflectinl the" public interest:' 
CORPORAnSM 
Corporatism can be defined u a political structure in which members of the 
state, labour. and business elites converge to wort out polities that will minimize the 
inherent conflicts and contradictions of the capitaU.st system, such as the relations 
between capitalists and worten.19 Both business and labour interest groups are treated 
u equal partners by the state. Again, as in most of the paradigms discussed previously, 
the co-operative efforts of these diverse organizations will be to establish consensus 
and the "public interest:' The state in corporatism, lite pluralism, is a neutral arbiter 
between business and labour interest-groups. The interaction between the state, as the 
dominant partner, and business interest Iroup(s) is focused towards achieving the 
following loalS: order, unity. nationalism. and success.20 
Leo Panit.ch. contends that the formation of interest sroups, such as the Business 
Council on National Issues. has been throush the state's approval in an effort to 
increase the close proximity between these two organizations.2! The reasoninl behind 
this is to have the business interest sroup act as a centralized organization. not only 
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suggesting possible policy concerns to the state, but justifyina state policies to its 
mem.bers. What. is interestinl to note in this context is the business interest. group 
actinl as a parallel bUNaucruy to the state, a concept that was originally discussed 
under elitism. Corporatism, like elitism. also assumes a cohesion of business interests. 
Furthermore, Pan itch concurs with Claus Orfe IS analysis that fra.ctional interest groups 
within the capitalist class are unnecessary for legitimation purpose, situ:e this is 
already i.D.sured by their existence within a capitalist system..22 The problem with this 
line of reasoning is that. it explicitly assumes that fractional interest groups within 
capitalism are not competins or conflictins. It is also important to note that the 
legitimacy sranted to the capitalist class is not absolute. but must be iaterpreted and 
reflected by state policies in the "public inteRst:' Corporatism. with its emphuis on 
interactions between business. labour. and the state, is a possible forum throulh which 
this can be achieved. 
One of corporatism's major problems. Uke that. of plunJ.ism.. and. public 
choice. is that the sta-W is dearly aot. a. neutra.l arbiter between the conflictin.g 
interests of busin.ess and labour.23 For instance, liven the dynamics and structure of 
the capitalist system, business group concerns must be considered dominant over those 
of labour. Therefore. the interactions within corporatism. are between the state and 
business interest groups only at the exclusion of the labour eUte. Perhaps this is 
because the activities of the participants within corporatism focus too much on capital 
accumulation without considering the legitimation component of consensus. 
Corporatism. does not present any viable m.eans through which there is a balance of 
power between the participants. The assumed stabUity of corporatism is a1so open to 
debate. Essentially, these problems can be reduced to the state's inabilit.y to produce 
consensus or the"public interest"that address conflicts between capital and labour in 
an equal and unbiased m.anner. 
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Another blherent shorwomin8 of corporatism is the rather ambivalent status 
liven to the state as an arbiter of conflicting interests. If for example, the state is 
placed within the realm of dvU society. its ability to reconcile the conflicting interests 
of labour and busilless is highly suspect. Yet corporatism, as a political system. 
suglests that the state, business. ed labour orsanizaUolls meet. as equal pa.rtners. I.e 
this respect. the state is not autonomous. However, the autonomy of the state would be 
necessary if it is to reconcile the cancerll1 of business and labour ill e unbiased 
funion. It has been advocated that the state, within corporatism. must be "relatively 
autonomous", representins the"pubUc interest:24 
IfSTRUYENTAl MMlIIM 
The final paradism to be discussed in this chapter is Marxism. This paradAsin. is 
founded upon the idea that the bue determines the superslructu.re.25 This mees that 
the base or economic otganimtion of production. commerce, and consumption wiU 
have a direct influence on the superstructure orsanizWon. of civil society and the 
state. Within a. capitalist framework. there are two major dasses within society -- the 
bourgeoisie (capitalist) and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie OW118 the means of 
production and the proletariat suppUes the labour functioll to the system. Labour is 
aJ:ways subordinate to the interests and needs of the capitalists smee power is 
monopolized by the class which profits from the socia! structure of a specific historical 
period.26 
The function of the state within Marxism is to aid in capital accumulation and 
legitimize the dominance of the bourgeoisie within civil society. The state has various 
means at its disposal to attain these ends. including the justified use of coercion towards 
the proletariat class, The members of the state's bureaucracies formulate and 
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implement public policy to defend the capitalist status quo .27 Such policies are 
legitimized to the working class under the fllfmie of the public interest. Manism is 
one of the paradigms, along with elitism and public choice. discussed thus far, that 
explicitly assumes that the state is not neutral and is used as a direct instrument of the 
capitalist class. This is why Marxism is sometimes referred to as an instrumental view 
of the state. The relationship between business interest groups and the state is strongly 
businElss-dominated.28 State polities are always highly advantageous to the capitalist 
class at the expense of the proletariat. Like corporatism, the public interest within 
instrumental Marxism is maintained by the state and business elites, at the exclusion of 
labour. 
One of the major criticisms of instrumental Marxism is the crude, deterministic, 
and "vulgar" representation of class relations within capitalist society. The paradigm 
lacks a certain finesse in its analysis of the often subtle forms of conflict found within 
capitalist society. This is the major amendment that neo-Marxist paradigms, which will 
be discussed in the following chapter, attempt to correct in their analyses. For 
example, Marxism assumes that the classes within capitalism are cohesive, 
homogeneous groups.29 This line of reasoning is not cogent, especially when 
discussing the membership of various business interest organizations. The Business 
Council on National Issues represents such monopoly capital interests as resources. 
foreign investment, manufacturing, and finance. The problem is made more acute 
when there is inherent conflict among the various capitalist interests. How does the 
business interest organization represent these competing concerns in its interactions 
with the civil service? How does the civil service reconcile the conflicting concerns in 
policies that. ostensibly. adequately and validly reflect the public interest? 
Another drawback of Marxism is its heavy reliance on the state's function as an 
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instrument of the bourle0111e for capital accumulation ud le,itimation. The validity 
of the st.ate i.o. articulating ud mai.o.taining the· public interest" for aU classes within 
society is compromised. Clevly, if the state is to be uythi.o.l more than It direct 
i.o.strume.o.t of bourleois i.o.terests, it must transcend the conflicts of civil society and 
become "relatively auto.Gomous". This is particulvly important for the civil se"ice's 
role of bei.G1 responsive to the diverse and c.onflictinl interests of alliroup, within 
society, i.o.dudi.o.g business. The state, through its policies. must somehow mai.ntai.n a 
delicate balance between addressing busi.o.ess concerns, while sim.ultaneously 
jusUfyinl its actions in terms of the public interest. 
Busi.o.ess-IOYernment relations. in terms of the interactions between members 
of the civil se"ice. and business interest orlanizations have bee.G eumined within the 
context of Elitism. Pluralism. Public Choice. Corporatism. and Instrumental Marxism. 
AU of these paradigms faU short in presenting a concept of the state u a neutral 
vbiter among competing and conflicting interest groups. Generally. the paradigms 
represent the state as an instrument for perpetuating the SI6JIIS fUO for the benefit of 
private 01," public bureaucratic or,anizations. How can the pubUc interest be 
articulated and "rpetuated Anthis context? Furthermore. it is not deu from the logic 
;". " l."<",'· 
of the. paradigms hoW' the state adopts a. particular form and function to mahltaln the 
dominance of a pa.rticular interest ,roup. Finally, how does the state interpret the 
public interest through the auspices of ca.pital a.ccumula.tion u.tI le,itim.ation? The 
l'U,xt chapter examines these problems by analyzing vvious neo-Marrist and post neo-
Marxist paradigms. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORY II 
This chapwr outlines and examines busin~:um-lO'Vernment relations within the 
framework: of certain neo-Marxist and post neo-Muxist paradigms, The neo-Manist 
paradigms to be analyzed include: instrumentalism, Antonio Gramsd's relative 
autonomy of the state and hegemony, structuralism, and state monopoly capitalism. The 
form and functions of the state, as well as. Bob Jessop's synthesis of various neo-Marxist 
paradigms wlU comprise the post neo-Marxist seetion. The final part of the chapter 
reveals the author's paradigm of business-government relations. combining specific 
elements of neo-Muxism and post neo-Marxism. 
The framework: of analysis is similar to the previous chapter, that is the role of 
the civil service, and business interest groups in articulating and .maintaining poUdes 
condueive to capitalism under the "public interest" f/lfll(/Q. Unlike the paradigms 
examined in chapter two. both neo-Marxism and post neo-Marxism explicitly assume 
that the role of the state is to maintain and defend the capitalist slMus fill) for business 
interest organizations. rather than beinl a neutral arbiter of competing interest 
groups within society. Each paradilm is also scrutinized in terms: of conceptual 
problems and shortcominls. 
Instrumentalism is a. neo-Marxist critical response to the pluralist paradigm. Us 
assumptions are fleshed out most extensively in the wrltinls of Ralph Miliband. 
According to MUiband. the capitalist class is composed of several economic eUtes. 1 The 
competition among these eUtes affec;:ts the political process, in. that the system. will 
discern which group's interest(s) will be accommodated by the state. However, this 
does not pre dude the separate elites from maintain.ing a cohesive and dom.inant class 
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with a common interest in perpetuating the sllltus fUI} for capitalism. Like his 
precursor, C. Yriaht Mills, MiHband is concerned with the question of whether the 
capitalists' ownership and control of crucial economic sectors co also be truslated 
into controlling the meos of political decision-maki.ng.2 The problem with this Une of 
reuoni.ng is tha.t it assumes elite coheslo.n within the political realm. Bow does the 
plurality of economic eUtes fit into MiHband's logic? If political decis.ion~ma.king 
represents a plurality of economic interests, Miiiband is reverting to pluralism instead 
of offering a neo-Marxist critical analysis. 
The state is defined by neo-Marxist. instrumentalism, not as a cohesive power 
bloc, but rather separate institutions.3 The source of state power originates from such 
institutions as the government. and the dvil service. Furthermore, MlHband is quite 
perceptive when he argues the government is iayested with power but the civU 
service coatrois power within the state.'~ The civil service's source of control is 
founded upon its If relative autonomy" from other state institutions. This relative 
autonomy is based upon such factors as lb.e pervasiveness of lb.e civil service. the lad: 
of any division between the political and administrative branches regarding the pollcy 
process: that is, the civil service formulates and implements public poUcy. The 
politically neutra.l filflllle of the civil service. as well as its permanence ris-a-ris 
elected officials. and its monopolization of expertise and knowledge being a source of 
power are also important in this context. 
Miliband also claims that the interaction between business interest stoups 
(such as the Business Council on Na.tional Issues) and the upper echelons of the civil 
service, as well as the government. occurs 'When individuals from business "colonize" 
the state a.ppara.tus.S In effect. members of the economic elites use the state apparatus 
as an instrument to influence externally or to formulate and implement policies 
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internally to refled their ca.pitalist interests. Alain, buildinl upon the theories of 
C. Wright Mills, MUiband postula.tes that there is a singie oligarchy composed of 
personnel with similar sodooeconomic background, education, and interests that. move 
fluidly between the rea.1ms of business, public service, and the government.6 
Miliband', line of reasoning is too deterministic and reductioaist in this instance, :lliAce 
the instrumental function is oriented towards capital accumulation without taking into 
account the equally crucial role of lesitimaUon. 
Since the "public interest" is synonymous yith the business elites' interests. 
the st.ate, and by extension the civil service, is not neut.ra.1.7 Contrary to the pluralist 
parwlm. MiHband contends that interest groups representing capital and labour do 
not compete on equal terms.6 Within a capitalist framework, the concerns of business 
will always have a higher ,riority in the state's agenda-setting process than the 
interests of labour. This is also reflective of Marx's original .. um,Uon. that within 
capitalism. t.he bue determines the superstructure. 
Finally, since the state is not a cohesive power bloc. JN1F" business interest 
groups will attem,t to interact with the executive or administrative echelons of the 
state and not the legislature.9 This is because the executive and administrative 
apparatus of the state hold the power to initiate and implement. public poUdes. 
Business in.terest groups must. voice their concerns at the formative stages of public 
policy making to either the civil service or the political executive. Once a public polity 
reaches the legislature, it is "cut in stone" and impervious to aU but minor technical 
changes. Maintaining the capitalist s/IJIQs guo to reflect business interests is hardly 
attainable through minor technical changes in poUdes. Clearly, in the policy process, 
power is concentrated at either the executive or administrative levels. The legislature 
has no autonomy from this power nor is it a counterbalance, but rather it is a rubber 
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stamp for the executive or administration '51 vill. 
In addition to the problems outlined thus far, instrumentalism hu the following 
shortcomings in presenting an adequate and cogen! paradigm of business-government 
relations. Instrumentalism offen a criticism. of the pluralist paradigm, but not an 
alternative to it..10 Too often MHiband's arguments are tra.pped within the pluralist 
snare that preMints no conceptual escape. MHiband', critics also point out that 
instrum.entalism does not take into account such state activities u legitimation which is 
not manipulated by capitalists, p6r .-.11 However, it is impo.rtant to quality Miliband's 
assumption in this context. Lesitimacy. within instrumentalism. refers to the capitalist 
sl8tlJs quo and not specifically to the heaemonic dominance of a particular capitalist 
fraction. Consequently,.U capiaaJ.ist fractions have a vested interest in maintaining 
and perpetuatinl the capitalist Sliltus quo. The alternative to instrumentalism, 'Within 
a neo-Manist fnmework, and 'Which has inspired prolific writings. is the structuralist 
paradigm. Before structuralism can be examined, it is essential to discuss briefly 
Antonio Gramsd's theories. vhich provide a prologue. 
ANTONIO GRlMIa: RELATI'E AUTONOMY Of THE STATE AND HEGEMONY 
Throuahout his writings, Antonio Gmmsci emphuizes that the state's form and 
function cannot be reduced to the economic determinism of vulgar Manism. Instead, 
he accentuates the salience of political forces and ideological practices, 'Whose specific 
form and impact are relatively autonomous from overt manipulation by the capitalist 
dass.l 2 For elample, Gmmsc:i maintains that the impact of economic crises depends on 
the strenath of the institutions of civil society I political Institutions and the resulting 
balance of social forces. The catalyst for capitalism's abilit.y to reproduce its class 
domination is the political and ideological "superstructure" and the relations inherent 
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amon, these forces. 
The state is seen as a class force yhich functions in or.anain, class domination 
as yeU u m.a.i.ntaining the long-run interests of the bourgeoisie. 13 These long-run 
interests are .rved by facilitating concessions to the subordinate doses from the 
bourgeoisie and brin,ing about voluntary acceptance of the sIIIJ:us fUI} by the 
proletariat. The relative autonomy of the state functions to maintain a. deUcate balmce 
of .ekinl short-term concessions from the ca.pitalists to labour in order to perpetuate 
the long-term interests of the dominant duses. The emphasis on the state's 
legitimation function renders Gramsti's insights to the relative autonomy of the state 
both cogent and profound. This line of reasoning can also be appHed to the civil 
service's ability to articula.te the public intere$t by bein, respon~ve to the divermfied 
concerns of society and attempting to bring a.bout a. consensus. 
Unlike MUiband. Gra.m.sd does not attribute the activities of the state to the 
interests of a particular dus or identify all political subjects as dus mbjects. 14 
Grwud is more interested in discerning hoy politicaJ. support is .maintained or 
yeakened through economic. political. and ideato,icaJ. practices that tnnscend c!us 
relations to in dude broader social relations. An eump., yithin this context might be 
the rtUSQIl d~1n of the civil service in .maintaining and perpetuating the "public 
interest:' Gramsd daims that political support is attained through the ,medium of 
hegemony.l5 
Hegemony includes not only the effective mobiUtation and reproduction of the 
"active consent" of the ruled by the dominant class through intellectual. mom. and 
politicaJ. leadership but. rather. taking systematic:: account of "popular interests" and 
demands. It further includes shifting positions and making concessions on secondary 
issues <those concerns not directly related to the short-term advantage of capital 
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accumulation) to uphold support and alliances in an inherently fluctuating and 
tenuous system of political relations. This must. be accomplished without foreaoing the 
primary interests of the dominant class and organizing the popular support for 
accomplishing national aoals. which se"e the primary long-term interests of the 
dominant Iroup. The civil s,"ice is adroit at mainwninl helemon:y through its 
political neut..ra1ity. permanence in office yiS-8-yjS elected officials. monopolization of 
information and expertise resulting in power, and finally being responsive to the 
needs of the public. Therefore, Gramsci successfully combines the concepts of 
hegemony and the relative autonomous state as means of maintaining capitalist 
domination. 
STRUCTURALISM 
As stated previously. structuralism is an alternative neo~Man:ist paradigm that 
attempts to transcend the conceptual problems of instrum.entalism. Nicos Pouhmtzas 
extends Gramsci's concept. of the ndative autonomy of the state, contending that the 
economic fra.ctioning of the bourgeoisie. into non-monopoly and monopoly sectors. 
such as resource, manufacturing. financial and foreign interests, tan. only be 
overcome by a state which displays its own internal d~ unity and institutional 
autonomy yJs..$-yis dominant daIS fractions.16 It is important to note at the beginning 
of this discussion that the term "structure" does not refer to the actual social 
institutions within society. but rather to the systematic functional inter-relationships 
among these institutions.11 The "relative autonomy of the state" within structuralism 
refers to its relative autonomy from manipulation by specific capitalist class members 
of society.1S Structuralists do not. however, arlue that the state is relatively 
autonomous from the structural requirements of society. Within capitalism, for 
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example, these structural requirements refer to accumulation. legitimation. and 
cohesion. 
Structuralism represents two crucial points of deputure from vulgar Marxism 
and instrumentalism. first, unlike the fore-mentioned paradilms, structumism. 
through its concept of relative autonomy, rejects any direct manipulation of the state 
by members of the capitalist class. Second, but equally important, structuralism 
recognizes that the capitalist class is not a. c:ohesive ,roup. but is composed of 
antagonistic rival "tractions". The conflicting concerns of these competing capitalist 
tractions will be discussed more extensively in the context of the interactions of the 
Business Council on Na.tional bsues and the civil service. 
Poulantzu also enlules on Ora.msd's role of hegemony by derivin, it from the 
institutional matrix of capita.1ism. as a W'ho1e.19 The institutional matrix refers to hoW' 
the fun.ctional inter-relationships of social institutions reflect the specific phase of 
capitalism and the intensity of the dass struilles. He relates the concept of hegemony 
to the dichotomy of the public sphere of politics and the private realm of civil society. 
which is considered the site of economic relations. The problem with this Une of 
reasoninl is that it is unclear what mechanisms. if any, serve to coordinate or unite the 
interests and a.ctivities of the public and private spheres. Consequently. the state is not. 
so much II re1a.tiveiy autonomous" as II relegated to isolation" within the structuralist 
paradigm. 
Clus relations are structurally absent from the organization of the capitalist 
state and its activities a.re oriented toward procuring cohesion among If individuated" 
citizens.20 RecaU that structunlism explicitly assumes the fractionin.g of sodal classes 
within capitalism. Consequently. the individual is a.1so unable to become put of a 
cohesive. unified social class. It is also crucial to remember that structura.1ism claims 
that the state is relatively autonomous from overt. manipula.t.ion by the capitalist class. 
Therefore, the bureaucracy CM. appear as u ia,eno.Du, .IuJ.t.ral iasUt.UeD. 
(tAlllt • .,ia. the .Gaill'd iateroH accordin, to a hierarchically structured and 
centrally coordinated system of formal, ,eneral. universal, codified .ra.tional-Ie,allaws. 
The administration relies on the economically ,rounded monopoly of force M.d the lack 
of overt political domination of its control; that. is, elected officials depend on the civil 
.rvice's knowledse ud expertise. Poulutzas also de clues that the purpose of heads 
of the state apparatus, who ostensibly .rve as formally impartial representatives of 
the public and national interest. must be re-interpreted by their • mclo pola.rb:ation 
around different fractional cO.lu:erns within the power bloc.2t One wonders how the 
" general interest" fSfIUle is maintained in this cue? 
Struc:turalism abo face, the foUowinl coaceptual hurdle, that it is unable to 
overcome. Poulutzas, like Gramsci. is overly determiaistic resardinl his ualysis of 
hoW' political dass domination is established W'ithin the rudimentary institutional 
forms of c:apitalism and hoW' domiaant fradions establish their hegemony throu,h 
specific political and ideoio,ical practices.22 What is at issue in this instance is hoW' the 
state becomes aware of which competbll capitalist fraction achieves helemonic 
control and orients its activities towards this dominance. The state's relative autonomy 
does not. sulgest. capitalist. muipulation. but. rather, distancing itself from the 
conflicting interests of civil societ.y. The very concept of relative autonomy becomes 
redundut since there are two "major" classes in capitalism and only two possible 
effects of state power.23 These possible results of state power are either the 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production or the transition to socialism. Since 
the lat.ter is eUminated. then the former must prevail. This criticism holds merit but it 
must be remembered that. structuralism categorizes the capitalist dan into splintered 
and competing fractions, rather than the revisionist. vulgar Manist label of It major" 
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(and, hence, cohesive?> classes. 
In his later discussions, Poulantzas considers the relative autonomy of the state 
as the total of the relative autonomies directed by various branches and autonomies.24 
However, the cohesion and unity of state power is severely limited in the contradictory 
and conflicting relative autonomy of those branches of the apparatus concerned with 
capital accumulation vis-a-vis legitimation. On other occasions. Poulantzas' argument. 
appears to vatUlate between the state's relative autonomy or the contingencies of 
political class struggle,25 For example, in the paradigm of hegemony, Poulantzas 
sometimes identifies the hegemonic fraction with reference to the particular form the 
state adopts to reflect that group's interests, However. he also identifies the hegemoniC 
fraction with reference to the specific political and ideological interests of the power 
bloc. This criticism questions Poulantzas ' priorities regarding the paradigm of 
hegemony. Does the state's form directly influence the specific group which will be 
hegemonically dominant and its ability to organize and articulate its interests. or, 
conversely. will particular hegemonic interests within the capitalist fractional 
struggle influence the form of the state? 
One of the ambiguities that is inherent in both instrumentalism and 
structuralism is their inability to analyze hoy the state decides upon its priorities and 
actions within the framework of capitalism.26 The paradigm of state monopoly 
capitalism attempts to address this problem. 
STATE MONOPOL' CAPITALISM 
State monopoly capitalism is founded upon the proposition that neither 
instrumentalism nor structuralism is complete since they both analyze the state IS 
activities from an external perspective.27 Claus Orfe argues that instrumentalism 
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attributes the state IS actions to the result of the external manipulation of the state 
apparatus by the rutinl class. The structuralists do not. advance a radically different 
perspective since they arsue that the state's activities merely reflect the conflicting 
relationships of external social institutions. Orfe's analysis is concerned with 
discovering the lateraa.t mechanisms of the state which reflect its class charader. 
State monopoly capitalism is defined as a distinct stage of capitalism, 
characterb:ed by a fusion of monopoly torces with the bourgeois state to form a sia,l • 
•• ehaaisa of eee •• ale 8:1,1.itaU •• aad d •• iastl •• ,28 The state's activities 
show a preoccupation with accommodating the interests of monopoly capital Iroups by 
almost or completely omitting the concerns of other non-monopoly capitalist fractions. 
Within this perspective, the conditions for acc:umulatioll for the capitalist class, as in 
structuralism. are fractured into the conflictio.g interests within and between 
monopoly and non-monopoly capital. The struggle for each Iroup to achieve 
hesemonic dominance means thai the capitalist system, within which each fraction 
operates, rUlls the risk of becoming impotent. Ii relatively autonomous state, with its 
emphasis on ratiollal policies from the perspective of capital as III whole. is a means 
throulh which the stato can maintain some sort of damlB.le control between the 
oPPolinl fractions. 
OrCe Ulues persuasively that such policies cannot depend upon any 
compromises or concessions of competinl capitalist interests but must be organb:ed to 
preserve the collective capitalist inte.rest.29 Clearly. the only mechanism. available to 
insUgate this is the capitalist state. A relatively autonomous state is necessary so thai it 
can act on behalf of the interest of monopoly capital in general and negate the 
interests of particular capital fractions. P8.rti CommuDistIJ Fn..tlfilise economist. 
PhiUipe Benol, claims the relative autonom.y of the state within this paradigm is 
derived from. its relative independence of administration r"is-il.-vis government.30 
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This logic reflects MUiband's dichotomy of the state bet 'Ween the government, which is 
Invested with power, and the civil service. which controls power. 
James O'Connor contends that the capitalist state must try to accomplish the 
contradictory tuks of accumulation and tegitimation.31 The policies of the relatively 
autonomous state must encourage capital accumulation while discourasinl unrest by 
those groups within society who do not benefit from the status IliO. The contradiction 
between these t'Wo functions becomes increuln,ly apparent in the monopoly capital 
phase since, while both accumulation activities and legitimation require more ud 
more government expenditure, profits are increasingly cODcentrated in fewer, private 
hands.32 Accordins to O'Connor, this imbalance results in a fiscal crisis. State 
monopoly capitalism intensifies this inherent problem of accumulation and 
legitimation.33 Under state monopoly capitalism, the Irowth of monopoly capitalism 
results in a congruent rise of state activities reludinl accumulation and legitimation. 
The ensuing increase of the state 'sactivities means a cause of increased growth for the 
monopoly sector u more of the costs, but not the benefits of accumulation. are shifted 
to the masses. 
State monopoly capitalism offers an alternative to instrumentalism and 
structuralism by attempting to provide insights into the internal mechanisms of the 
state which reflect its class character. The paradigm has a couple of conceptual 
difficulties. which wilt be discussed briefly here. One of the criticisms of state 
monopoly ca.pitalism points out that. since the state a.ds to overcome the problems and 
contradictions exclusively for the benefit of one fraction. it consequently aggravates 
them for other capital fractions.34 However. this Une of reasoning seems to be 
reverting to the reductionism and instrumentalism of v'Ulgar Marxism. For instance. 
both the relatively autonomous state and a business interest group. such as the Business 
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Council on Nation&t Issues, can use a common:ipubUc interest"f6fadoto counter this 
problem. Critics &tso ugue that if the state within ~ monopoly capitalism 
intervenes in. derence of the coUective interests of capitaJ., it stili requires politic&t 
support (read: legitimacy) to implement these pollties.35 Consequently, the state 
cannot avoid favourins o.ce capital fraction over another. This criticism can be 
countered by explicitly usuminl that the state's legitimacy function attempts to ul1ite 
the various monopoly fractions' interests whUe simultaneously mainwninl their 
hegemonic dominance ris-6.-ris the competing (mostly non-m.onopoly) fnctions of 
capitaJ.. Again, to argue that. the state's legitimation function. can be manipulated by 
any Ol1e specific mOl1opoly fraction reflects determmism to a cerwn. extent. Further, 
this tme of reasoninl is ul1dear as to how the state is able to recognize the dominance 
of a specific monopoly capital fraction. While state mo.copoly capitalism brinss 
attention to the lntern.u means throulh which the state reflects its character, post neo-
Marxist paradigms, such as forms and functions of the state, attempt to fine-tune the 
an.alysis by question.inl how the state determines the method and scope of its activities. 
PoST NEO-MNmSM: FORMS AND fUNCTIONS 0. THE STATE 
This post neo-Marxist paradigm takes as its point of departure the idea that it is 
systematically possible to derive the state as a political form from the nature of 
capitalist relations of productions.36 From this assumption. the paradigm questions the 
structuralist notion of the relative autoftomy of the state.37 Why is the state 
disassociated from the dominant class? How can the state articulate and perpet.uate 
capitalist intensts if it takes on the form of ail impersonal mechailism of public 
authority that. is isolated from society? In other words, the forms and functions of the 
state theorists do not accept the state's relative autonomy as a COBceptual liveB. 
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Rather, the paradigm questions how a state institution such as the civil service can 
articulate the public interest. 
These "post neo-Marxist" theorists argue that the state should be re-interpreted 
u a means through which various members of bourgeois sodety discover that their 
mutual concerns res;ardins; capitalist. reproduction ue mainwned alongside but. 
sometimes in opposition to their particular interests.38 Therefore. the structuralist 
paradigm of the state is rendered less abstra.ct and ambiguous, since the state not only 
reflects but a.1oo •• 1D,.U •• conflict. For e:mmple, Rianne Mahon's analysis. within 
the Ca.o.adian context, asserts that this 'WU, and continues to be the nisoll d'llntof the 
federal Department of Labour.39 The state, throuSh the auspices of the department. acts 
U a legitimation mechanism by formally condoning or sanctionins the existence of 
trade unions and by involving labour in tti-lateral activities with the state and the 
business community. 
A bUsiness interest group, such as the Business Council on National Issues, 
analyzed through the forms and fUnctions of the state paradigm. would work alongside, 
as opposed to being an external source of policy input for the dvil service. In effect, 
the Business Council on National Issues fun.ctions as a para.llel bureaucracy to the civil 
service in articulating the common good. Through this intera.ction, the forms and 
functions of the state reflect and adapt to capitalist interests. Unfortunately, this 
almost sounds like a revisionist. concept. of vulgar Marxist instrumentalism or 
Miliband's neo~Ma.rxist instrumentalism.. Both paradigms depend too heavily on the 
eeemoaie 'umeUeD. of the state, that is. capital accumulation. without taking into 
account the legitimation and social cohesion roles. 
Alona with economic determinism. the forms and functions of the state 
approach tends to rely heavily on historical specifidty.<tO Consequently, the forms and 
46 
functions paradigm argues tha.t the structures of the state are objects of class struggle 
and that the dass struigle determines the development of the state '51 structure:41 What 
both criticisms point to is the rather l1t11Joc na.ture of the class struggle within the 
forms and functions paradigm. However, this reuoninl does tate into account the 
influence of the proletariat. in the class st..rulile. For example. an alternative to 
structuralism as an explanation of welfare state policies or the establishment of the 
Department of Labour. both lelitimaiion functions. might involve the forms and 
functions puadigm. Withi.o. this context., the paradilm illustrates the mate's forms and 
fu.o.ctions as beinl reactive to class conflict within capitalism.i2 The maw does not. 
have the ability of being clllirvoYlUJ1 relardinl clm conflict and planning its 
appropriate form and function. Rather, it react.s to dm conflicts in society throulh 
poUcies that are incremental, short-term solutions, upholding the stMus 1/110 for a 
particular capitalist. fraction, or creating a new one When a different fraction obtains 
hegemonic dominance. 
Critics of the forms and functions of the state model allege that there is no 
certainty that the state will discover the "correct" forms of intervenUon:43 The use of 
the term .. correct" in this instance is contentious and misleading as it implies a 
normative and subjective connotation. For example, is a particular state form and 
function "correct" in aU situations or is it limited by historical specificity? 1)oes the 
term" corred" also sulgest etfidency and/or effectiveness? 
A common characteristic of aU the neo-Muxist and post neo-Marxist paradigms 
on business-government relations discussed thus far is t.hat the concepts presented 
within each one are not totally comprehensive or specific. The question that begs to be 
as.ked is: why? One reason might be that each new paradigm does not. use former ones 
as a means of synthesizing conceptual elements of both. Rather, each subsequent. 
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paradiam points out shortcomings without addressing problems common to both. As a 
result. the paradigms contain Hveral ambiguous and abstract proposiUoDs. This is 
particularly applicable to neo-Marlist instrumentalism and structuralism. Both 
paradigms emphasize that the state must be relatively autonomous from any overt 
manipulation by the capitalist class, p"r ... to maintain its accumulation and le,itimacy 
functions. But, as state monopoly capitalism ud form and functions of the state 
theorists correctly point out, this relative autonomy is dependent upon external social 
forces. For elample, how can the state articulate and maintain capitalist interests if it 
is isolated from the class Strul,ies of civil society? 
A second shortcoming of these puaW,ms is a common tendency towuds 
economic determinism. Essentially, aU the ute', activities cu be reduced to 
maintaining and perpetuating capita.i8.(;cumulaUon. A comprehensive and convincing 
neo-Marxist or post neo-Ma.rlist paradilm must account for the state's activities 
re,ardin, both capital accumulation and legitimation. The final two paradigms 
discussed in this chapter attempt to maintain a conceptual baluce between the state's 
capital accumulation and legitimation functions. Some may contend that. the author's 
paradigm OD busiDess-loverDment relations reflects a "fetish" regardin, the ute's 
legitimation function. However, this perspective is defended since the civil service's 
rtJison d'tJlnJ is maintaining the"pubUc interest~ If it is to successfuUy mystify its 
support of capital accumulation and bourgeois dominance. the civil service must 
maintain a f'lIfIUIlI of being responsive to aU interest I1'OYpS within societ.y. In this 
contelt, .legitimation is connected to responsiveness. Without u equal emphasis on 
.legitimation. the state's activities become overtly coercive in maintaining the capitalist 
siMlJs ,uo and it. runs the risk of a proletariat revolt. 
TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS: JESSOpaS CAPITALIST STATE 
Jessop begins by presenting certain guidelines for construct-ins an adequate 
Manist. account of the state in capitalist. societies. One of the suldelines he discusses is 
that state power is capitalist. to the extent that. it aids and maintains the process of 
capital accumulation in a given situation and it is non-capitalist. to the extent that 
capital accumulation is not realized.1i Jessop appears to be overly deterministic in this 
pre-requisite. The msoll d'ltn of the neo-Marlist. paradi,m of a relatively 
autonomous state contends that its activities wiU not directly benefit the capital 
accumulation needs of the bourgeoisie, but also emphuize legitimation and sodal 
cohesion. However. the author reco,naes the validity of Ofre's argument that. relative 
autonomy of the state may be required to establish a common capitalist interest among 
competing fnctions. 
Often the state'S relative autonomy is used u a source of explaining the 
functionality of the state. Jessop argues this reuoning is problematic since it u51,n8 
relative autonomy to the state in order to guarantee its subordination to the bourgeois 
interefii of capital accumulation and political domination.iS Jessop indicates that one 
way to escape this polemical cui de $lJ.C is to analyze the relative autonomy of the st.ate 
through a unique institutional structure. For example. the civil service maintains and 
perpetuates dominance over the lovernment within the state in the following ways: 
no dichotomy between politics and administration, a monopoly on expertise, 
informatio.11, and knowledge which translates i.11to power, permanence of positions, 
and. the fllfMle of neutrality. Another example within the context of business-
lovernme.11t relations is the social basis of support and resistance of the state's 
activities. The state's interaction with the Business Council on National Issues can be a 
way of articulat.ins capitalist interests and possible sources of fractional coaCH.::t or 
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determining policy effectiveness in relation to bourgeois fractional dominance. This 
can be achieved by elamining how well the civil service is able to satisfy capitalist 
needs under the national interest flJ,fde. Also, having the civil service interact with 
the Business Council on National Issues as a type of sounding board regarding policy 
output and policy outcome and thus, becoming aware of any sources of conflict between 
the two types of policies. This would also tend to minimize the isolated position of the 
civil service within the relative autonomy of the state paradigm. Like the state forms 
and functions theorists, Jessop stresses an in-depth analysis of hoy the state's relative 
autonomy is maintained and perpetuated, instead of taking it as a given. 
An analysis of the relative autonomy of the state should consider how a 
particular Department or Ministry can offer support for the hegemony of a particular 
class fraction.46 For example, Mahon's analysis attributes the Federal Finance 
Department with maintaining the hegemonic dominance of the finance capitaJ 
fraction.41 It may also depend on the specific Ministry or Department's state function; 
that is, does it serve to maintain capital accumulation or legitimation? Neither can be 
seen as a separate phenomenon occurring in isolation. Rather, both effect each other 
by osmosis since they reflect power as the condensation of the balance of class forces 
in the struggle.46 This analysis of power is closely related to such factors as the 
analysis of organization, modes of caiculation, resources, strategies and tactics of 
different agents, that is, state Ministries or Departments and interest groups. The 
relations among the fore-mentioned agents must also be considered, including the 
structural opportunities, those elements in the social formation that are beyond an 
agent's ability to change at a given time. as weH as the conjectural opportunities, those 
aspects in the social formation that a specific agent can change at a given time. AU of 
these factors will determine the overall balance of forces within the class struggle. 
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O.nce the various facton which reflect power as the condensatio.n of the balance 
of forces in the class struggle have been determined. Jessop postulates that the next 
level of analysis involves means through which a "relative" unity of diverse social 
forces can be estabUshed:49 He asserts that the concept of a hegemonic project can be 
one way throulh which this relative unity is facilitated, The hegemo.tlic project 
resolves the ambiguous problem betwee.tl particular and general interests by involving 
the mobilization of support. behind a "national-popular" programme. This programme 
maintains the ,eneral i1lterest in pursuing goals that explicitly 01' implicitly advw:u:e 
the long-range i.tlterests of the hegemonic class or fraction. It also reveals which. 
privileges (that is. specific "e(:o.tlomic corporate" interests) are compatible with this 
programme and suppresses lnconsistent. ones. 
This pfocea is similar to the concept of "non-decision makins" within the 
pluralist mod.el. It is also suggestive of Claus Offe's system of filten, 50 Orfe ide.tltifies 
four mechanisms through which the hierarchical filter system operates: structure. 
ideology. process, and repression, Each level progressively eliminates i.tlterests which 
are counter to the capitalist. status quo and have not been screened by the previous 
levels, 
For eumple. the first level, structural selective mechanisms is the broad limits 
of possible state actions defined by the overall structure of political institutions, orr, 
points to the importance of the state's protection of private property rights and capital 
accumulation. The structural .lective mechanisms also function as auldelines for 
interest sroups a.rticulati1lg their concerns to the state -- :recall the "cardinal rules" 
business interest groups operate under in pluralism. discussed in the previous chapter. 
Ideololicai mechanisms spedfy which i1lterests are recognized and 
acknowledged as problems to be solved. In this context. some polley choices are defined 
as non-events since they are not compatible with. perpetuatins the capitalist SlJllUSljuo. 
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This is analogous to Bachrach and Barat.%'s concept of non-decision making. 
The mechanism of process ensures that. the decision-makins rules provide 
certain interest groups with an advantage over others. For mstance, the Business 
Council on National Issues. because it has "the right stuff" io terms of being a 
permal1el1t, institutional interest sroup and has a greater stake in maintainins the 
capitalist s/IUus (jUo, wilt be able to exploit the system more advantaseously than 
another Mlhoc orga.nization. 
The finalieve! within the hierarchical filter system is the repressive apparatus 
of the state which excludes given alternatives through direct coercion. Recall the 
Federal Department of Labour's mandate of internalizing ca.pitalist-labour conflict and 
maldog trade union interests more pala.ta.ble to bourgeoisie concessions. Orfe ends his 
analysis by sa.ying that when the selective mechanisms are performing in 8m optlma.l 
ma.nner, .it is not possible to prove the class nature of the state. The civil service '5 
"public interest." 1'.;_ a.nd its responsiveness to the concerns of society a..re buic to 
this mystifying process. 
Jessop alleges that the problem with a hegemonic project is a..rticulating certain 
"pa..rticular interests" into a "general il1terest" acceptable. not. 0111y to capitd. but a.lso 
to the particular interests of bureaucrats.51 There are two areas of ambiguity with 
Jessop's statement. First, under the term" general interest". does Jessop mean aU or just 
specific fractions? Second. is the discouraging of other particular interests to be 
defined in terms of other capitalist fractions or the legitimation function of the state? 
These shortcomings aside, Bob Jessop's fra.m.ework for analyzing the capitalist state's 
a.ctivities is a useful a.ttempt at synthesizil1g ideas from va..rlous paradigms. The 
following neo-Marxist paradigm on business-government relations hopes to emulate 
Jessop's synthesis. 
TOWARDS A PRELIINMY NEO-MARXISt PMADIGM 
Of euSIMeSs-GO'SllMENT RELAnoMS 
52 
This paradigm. lib the preceding ones. will analyze business-goverltment 
relations in terms of the structure of the state, and the business interest organization. 
By studying the iateractions of the Busilless Council on National Issues with the dv.il 
service, the analysis focuses on how the state's form and function reflects mon.opoly 
capital (;OilCeril5 uilder the "public interest" flJfue. What is impo.rta.nt to emphasize at 
this point is an equ1Hbrium of state activities between capital accumulation and 
lelitimation. The discussion attempts to SYilthesize ideas from both ileo-Marxist and 
post neo-Marxist paradigms. 
The graphic portrayal of this paradigm is iUustrated in Figure 3.1. Notice that 
withiil the state's structure there is a dichotomy between the government and the civil 
service. This reflects neo-Marxist instrumentalism. which contends such a division is 
necessary since the government is invested with power. through the liberal 
democratic process of popular elections, but the civil service controls power. The dvU 
service's relative autonomy is the source of controlling state power. This relative 
autonomy is based upon its pervasiveness throughout the state, the lack of separation 
between formulation and implementation regarding public policies. the political 
neutrality f~ which translates into being responsive to the needs of society. the 
monopolization of expertise and knowledge. and finally the permanence of public 
servants yis-li.-yis elected officials. These characteristics are also fundamental in 
explaining how the state is able to maintain its capitalist creed without being overtly 
subordinate to bourgeois domination. 
The state '$ rela.tive autonomy. described in this manner, incorporates both 
structuralism and the post neo-Marxist forms and functions of the state. Structuralist 
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writers such as Poula.o.tzas put forth the idea. that the econom.ic fractioni.o.g of the 
bourgeoisie into non-monopoly a.o.d mo.o.opoly capital, and the further spli.o.terinl of 
the latter group into resource. maaufa.cturing. financial, and foreign interests can 
only be subdued through a state which exhibits its own class unity and institutional 
autonomy fl'is-Ji-fI'is dominant class fractions. 
State form and functio.o. theorists. Flatow aad Huisken. similarly contend that 
the mate should be discussed 1.0. terms of unitinl the frldional i.o.terests of bourseois 
society throush their commo.o. concer.o. of capitalist reproduction, a.io.o.gside aad 
occasionally co.o.trvy to their particular interests. The structuralist paradigm of 
relative autonomy of the state is clarified 1.0. that the state not only reflects conflict 
among socia! i.o.stitutions but actually embodies co.o.flict. 1.0. this respect. Mabon's 
chuacterizatio.o. of the fede.ra1 Fina.o.ce Department as perpetuating and leaitimwna 
the fina.o.da! fraction's dominance throup the ".o.ational interest" /1If1J(/1J is 
i.nsightful. The Deputme.o.t of Fina.o.ce. the President of the Treasury Board. and the 
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Bank of Canada might serve similar policy roles. Again, it is not e.o.oush to assume the 
state is relatively auto.o.omous but. rather, the level of analysis must be extended to 
include how the state maintains its autonomy through the structure of its institutio.o.s. 
The structure of the Business Council 0.0. National Issues can be aaalyzed as a 
"paraJJel bureaucracy" a.o.al0lous to the civil service. Uke the civil service. this 
business interest group ope.rates as a permanent institutional orsanizatio.n utilizing its 
resources to articulate the concerns of monopoly capital members to public serva.o.ts. 
Interaction with the civil service is primarily focused on the policy process since it is 
exactly this activity which luarantees capital accumulation and legitimation of 
monopoly capital hegemonic dominance. 
Usin, state monopoly capita..lism as a startina point. the Business Council 0.0. 
National Issues represents, like the state within the same paradiam, the collective 
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i.nterests of such mo.nopoly ca.pital u resources, muufa.during, fi.nance and foreign 
investment. Accordingly. the Busi.ness Council on Natiolla.1 Issues does not. restrict its 
a.ctivities to representing the interests of only one monopoly capital fraction. Ute the 
civil service's "public illterest" fllfJU/e, the Business Council on Na.tiona.1 Issues 
represents the coliective "genera.1 business interest". This is crucial in mai.nwni.na 
t.he cohesiveness of the group since the puticulu interests of its members are often 
conflicting, and, to provide legitimation of the state's activities to the organization's 
members. The business interest. group hu an lmpona.o.t state in mainwning the 
sl8tus ,uo but cannot risk being perceived u a ca.pita1ist mechanism of overt state 
manipulation. Rather, it will present capitalist. interests analogous to II national issues". 
thereby suggesting that. its elite concerns encompass the "common good". It is 
precisely for this reason that Mahon's false dichotomy of state and interest. groups 
regardinl "representation" and "legitimacy" is misleading.52 
The interactions between the Busine" Cou.o.cil 0.0. National Issues and the civU 
service represent the fusion of monopoly forces with the bourgeois state, which is 
indicative of state monopoly capitalism. But, u previously emphasized. it is not enough 
to assume this i.o.teractio.n. The analysis mum. also explaJ..a the auspices under which 
this activity takes place. Within this co.ntext, Gramsci's co.acept of hegemony is 
relevant. The previous diseussio.a stressed hegemony's rote in takin.g IYstematic 
account of popular interests u a means of maintain.in.g support and alliances i.n an 
in.herenUy unstable and fraliie system of political re1a.tion.s, without. surrendering the 
primary goals of accumulation and legitimation. Furthermore, hegemony enables t.he 
state to organize this support as a mea.ns to reach national goals which serve the 
primary long-term interests of the dominant group, The civil service can achieve 
hegemony through its political neutrality, permanence ris-li.-ris elected officials, and 
finally, the monopoly on expertise and k.now1edle it possesses. Jessop, in his analysis, 
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expands on Gramsd '$ concept of hegemony by introducing the hegemonic project. 
The hegemonic project tries to coalesce divergent particular and general 
interests by initiating support behind a concrete national-popular programme. Within 
the Canadian context., such "national interest" policies as "Free Trade", "The Meech 
Lake Accord", "The Goods and Services Tax", and poHcies to protect the environment, 
represent the "common good" in pursuing goals that. explicitly or im.plicitly advance 
the long-term interests of the dominant monopoly capital fraction. Through the 
hegemonic project, the capitalist state, as defined by the civil service, tries to establish 
a consensus by employing the fa;lJ.(/Qof "public interest" and responsiveness. 
However, the concept of the hegemonic project can also be applied to the 
interaction between the civil service and the Business Council on National Issues. The 
Business Council on National Issues is a mechanism through which interest 
articulation of the dominant monopoly capital fraction is expressed to members of the 
civil service. The civil service can then formulate and implement the appropriate 
hegemonic project to secure the concerns of monopoly capital th.rough the public 
interest f~ade. Equally important is the business interest group '5 communication link 
to its monopoly capital members in order to ensure consensus and cohesiveness within 
the organization. 
CONClUSON/SUYMARY 
Th.e focus of this chapter has been the analysis of business-government 
relations by various neo-Marxist and post neo-Marxist paradigms. The shortcomings of 
these explanations are essentially economic determinism at the expense of the state's 
function of legitimating the capitalist sla.llIS qUI). The final paradigm discussed focused 
on incorporating various aspects of neo-Marxism and post neo-Marxism. As well. a 
convincing neo-Marxist paradigm of business-government relations must attempt to 
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synthesize the concepts of capital accumulat.ion and legitimation. The next chapters 
attempt to apply this model in terms of the interactions between the Federal civil 
service and the Busin.ess Council on National Issues. 
FIGURE 3.1 
-A PREllMINMY NEO-MMIIST MODEL 
OF BUSINESS-GOYERNMENT RELATIONS· 
Civil Service fIj ctJJJtrols power within the state 
Business Council 
on National Issues 
• Attempts to maintain hegemonic 
dominance of monopoly capita!, 
i.e" resource, manufacturing. 
finance, and foreign investment 
concerns over competing 
fractional interests of 0.00.-
monopoly capital . 
• functions as relatively autonomous institution via 
1) maintaining/perpetuating "national interest" 
It legitimation <through neutrality I 
responsiveness flJfade) 
iD capita.1ist accumulation via Department of 
Finance, Treasury Board, National Bank's Policy 
formulation. 
Government 
(iJ1V8Sledwith power) 
.. Controls conflict between classes, 
• ArtiCUlates and maintains a 
"general business" interest in its 
interactions with the civil service 
to mai.ntain consensus and 
cohesiveness among its members. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE STRUCTURE Of THE BUSINESS COUNCIL ON NATIONAL ISSUES 
Now that the theoretical framework for dis(ugin, business-,overnment 
relations has been established. the next level of analysis involv,s applyiBI the 
author', paradigm to th, interactions betweeB the business interest group and the civil 
service. This chapter deals with the structure of the BusiBess CouBcil oj). National 
Issues. while Chapter Five discusses policy scope. Finally, Chapter SiJ; deals with the 
process of interaction, including the specific stages of the policy process at which the 
business interest Iroup influences particular branches of the state, i.e" the civil 
service and the lovernment. The analysis attempts to iBtelrate the concepts of 
accumulation and legitimatioB since both are salient in discovering l." the state 
maintains the monopoly capital fraction's hegemonic dominance under the "public 
interest" 1'/lfa.tW. 
As mentioned previously, this chapter deals with the Business Council on 
National Issues (hereafter referred to as either "BeN!" or "The Business CouncU") and 
how its structure is conducive to perpetuatinl the accumulation interests of its 
membership. The BCNI is probably the most exclusive business interest group in 
Canada. serving a clientele of monopoly capital corporations in the resource, 
manufacturing. financial. and. foreign investment sectors. Although less overtly 
confrontational throulh its interactions with politicians or civil servants and, 
therefore perhaps, less weU-known to the public than its non-monopoly capital 
counterpart, the Ca..o.adian Federation of Independent Business. it nevertheless mates 
its presence known in the halls of political power. The analysis of the Business 
Council's structure wiU encompass the reasons vhy the organiza.tion was created as 
well as the deVelopment of its mandate. The discourse provides a prologue for a.pplying 
the a.uthor·s paradigm of business-government relations to this important 
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THE FOUNDING Of THE BUSINESS COUNCIL ON NATIONAl ISSUES 
Before a discussion of the mandate of the BeNt can be attempted, it is important 
to discover and analyze the forces which acted as catalysts for its formation. One of the 
buic premises of all neo-Manis! parwams on business-aovernment relations, 
int1udins the author's. is t.hat the state functions to facilitate accumulation and 
leaitimize the dominance of the monopoly capital fraction within the staJus guo, 
Ostensibly, the state is receptive to the COiu::erns of this ,roup and. subsequently, 
formulates and implements appropriate policies, Within the context of state monopoly 
capitalism. a bond develops between monopoly capitalist forces and the bOUf'leois state 
to form a. single mechanism of economic elploitation and domination) The state serves 
to perpetuate and legitimate the interests of monopoly capital by the near or total 
negation of other fractions, In other words, the helemonic dominance of the 
monopoly capital fraction is at the eJpense of non-monopoly capital fractions, 
However. the inherent conflict and competition between monopoly and non-monopoly 
fractions. u well as the struilies waged alainst the proletariat. mean that the stability 
of this system of helemonie dominance is tenuous, This is the situa.tion monopoly 
capital faced in the mid-1970's which served to hasten the development and 
establishment of the Business Council on National Issues, 
During the economic crisis which seemed to characterize the TrudelU 
governm.ent of the 1970's, there WIS a perception among members of the monopoly 
capital fraction that the state, through its relative autonomy, 'WU unable to provide the 
conditions necessary for helemonic dominance.2 One of the main driving forces that 
led to the formation of the BeNI wu the uncertainty that monopoly capital faced in 
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maintainins helemo.nic domi!uuu:e over other fractions and dasses. This situation wu 
exacerbated by the implementation of such "controversial" (to the business 
community. in any respect) policies by the Canadian government u wale and price 
controls. The stability of the Ca.o.adian economy 'Wu also shuen. first. by the oil crisis 
of 1973-197., which produced a world-wide increase of prices, and second, by the 
resu1tini recession. Accordinl to Jock A. Finlayson. BeN! Vice President in charge of 
Policy and Research: 
"In that period of tim.e. there wu a seneral perception that rela.tions 
with the government, the Fede.ra1government in puticular. were poor 
and that the voice of business in dedina 'With the government wu 
weaker. not 88 coherent or 'WeU-organized. u it should be ideally." 3 
Cleuly, if monopoly capitalists from the resource, manufacturing. financial. and 
foreign investment sectors were to maintain their collective hegemonic dominance 
over non-monopoly capital fractions and the working c1uses. a vehicle had to be found 
to present their concerns to the state in a cohesive and coherent manner. These were 
the auspices under which the BCN! wu formed. The Business Council wu established 
in 1976 -- one yeu after the government introduced "qe and price controls. 
What is interesting to note about the BeNI's internal structure is the way in 
which. it reflects the evolution of its mandate of representing the concerns of its 
members under the "pubUc interest" Iil;Mle. At its inception in 1976, the BeNI was 
founded and chaired by W.O. Twaits, retiring Chair of Imperial OU and Alfred Powis. 
President of Noranda. with the intent of creating an effective mechanism. through 
which the business community could voice its concerns to the government:'! However. 
there were two factors which hindered any productive dialogue between the business 
interest. group and the government. First. there was the frust..rated and aggressive 
attitude that characterized the BCNI's initial contacts 'With the lovernment. Second, 
both Twaits and Powls had experience in corporation boardrooms but not in the halls of 
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political power. Hence. they had no knowledge of how the government ope.ra.ted and 
who to talk to within the upper echelons of the civil service or the government. Any 
consensus within the organization wu tenuous since other monopoly capital interests 
(e.g., manufacturing. finance. or foreiln investment> would feel that their concerns 
were not being liven the same amount of consideration 'Pis-a.-vis the resource sector, 
which Imperial Oil and Noranda represented. Somehow. the concerns of the BeN!'s 
membership had to be harnessed into a cohesive organization. in which the "gene.raJ. 
business interest" was the mandate to be followed. If this could not be accomplished. 
the monopoly f.raction would be unable to maintain its hegemonic dominance over the 
competing non-monopoly fractions or even the working class. 
The BeNI very quickly discovered that in the age of information. knowledge is 
power. Knowledse sives access, not only to civil servants. since a common language is 
being spoken. but also to politicians, slace they require private sector expertise in 
terms of placing concerns on the policy-seWn I agenda, policy implementation, and as 
a source of feedback regardics policy effediveness. Enter Thomas eI' Aquino, who since 
198t when he became President and Chief Executive Officer of the BeN!. has been 
instrument.a.l in voidng the unified COi'u:erns of the monopoly capital fraction to the 
state. A quintessential technocrat. d'Aquino knows how civil servants and politicians 
operate, havinl worked in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) from 1969 to 1912. Durinl 
this time. d'Aquino was part of the new "alternate bureaucracy" that Trudeau created 
in an effort to break the civil service monopoly on expertise and to concentrate power 
in the hands of poUticians, not bureauc.ra.ts. Administrative members such as d'Aquino 
and Finlayson ensure that. aU the concerns of the BCNI's corporate membenhip are 
articulated effectively and equaUy to the state since they are not directly involved in 
one specific secto.raJ. interest, jJ81'.. This also facilitates brinling about a consensus 
am.ong the organization's members. However, this is not to suggest that the BCNI's 
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technocrats ue unresponsive to or are isolated trom interactions 'With their corporate 
constituents. The Busbu~ss Council, Ub a major corporation, has a Board of Directors or 
"policy committee", 'Whose thirty members reflect the different interests of the 
monopoly capital fraction,S 
THE BarS MEMIERSHIP 
The growth of monopoly capitalism in Canada has been chuacterized by a high 
degree of concentration and geographic centralization.6 Finlayson substantiates this 
by stating that the original founding fathers of the BeNI 'Were Chief ~ecutive Officers 
(CEOI) of major Ontario companies.7 The membership of the Business Council 'Was 
subsequently e:xtended to corporations in Quebec. The concentration of monopoly 
capitalism is .reflected in the fact that the members of the BeNI are the CIOB of the 
largest two hundred industrial companies and the top one hu.tldred financial service 
corporations in Canada. What is interesting to note in this context is the position of 
Chief E:xecutive Officer that is a pre-requisite for membership 'Within the BCHI. The 
question that begs to be uked is: why this specific position u oppoHd to Vice-
President or another member of the company's Board of Directors? 
Finlayson says that the BeN!', "No Substitution Rule", whereby group meetings 
must be attended by the CEOs rather than a Vice-President, is unique within Canadian 
business orlanizations,a LangiUe implies tha.t the reasoning behind having CIOs 
comprise the Business Council 'WU tha.t lovernment Ministers required individuals able 
to execute quick decisions and exhibit f1elibility/~ Another ulument which can be 
made in this context is that the Chief Executive Officer's most important responsibility, 
within the corporate hierarchy, is to brinl about CelllJIUana between such competing 
and possibly conflicting departments as Research/Development, Marketinl, 
66 
Manufacturing. a.nd Fina.nce. Therefore. Chief Encutive Officers, u members of the 
BeN! policy committee. can present cohesive proposals to either senior politicians or 
the upper echelons of the civil service. This is particularly crucial since the monopoly 
capital fraction must maintain its heaemonic dominance over the non-monopoly 
fractions as well as the proletariat dusel. The state is the only mechanism able to use 
coercion legitimately to achieve this end. 
As mentioned previously. the BeN! is composed of the largest. t.wo hundred 
industrial companies and the top one hundred flnucial service corporations in 
Canada. Jointly the corporations that compose the business interest group's 
membership employ one ud a half million Canadians and hold assets equalling nine 
hundred billion dollars.! 0 The membership represents monopoly capital in re,ources 
(Noranda Inc., Shell Canada Limited, Canlor Corporation), manufaduring (The Molson 
Companies Limited. DomiDJon Textile Inc., Redpath Industries Limited), finance, which 
not only iD.dudes Canada's five major banb, but abo iD.vestmeD.t firms and insurance 
companies (The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Buk of MOD.trea1. Buk of Nova 
Scotia. Toronto-Dominion Bank, Royal Buk of Canada, Burns Fry Limited. the 
LaureD.tiu Group Corporation), as well u foreiln muUi-JlatioD.a1 intere,ts (ITT Canada 
Limited, Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, IBM Canada Limited») I Even though 
the members come from v&rious sectors of the monopoly fraction, the BeN! represents 
their collective interests (i.e., maiD.taining hegemonic dominuce over the non~ 
monopoly fracuoD.s and the working dasses, capital accumUlation, and legitimation of 
their needs) ud is not concerned with sectoral issues. Finlayson elabora.tes on this by 
saying: 
"The Business Council does not deal with issues that are sector-specific or 
tompuy-specific. Simila.rly, if an individual has a. problem with 
govern.men.t, we abo don't rea.11y get involved in what I would call 
company-specific advoca.cyor lobbying wort. Similarly. we don't .redly 
do advocacy work for individual industries, and. within Canada., there are 
many conflicts that really pit one company against the other. For 
example, the trust companies asainst the banks of who should be allowed 
to own trust companies. Should they allow concent.rated ownership? 
Insurance companies againm. the banks on the question of should banks 
be able to.ll insurance?"j2 
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Notice how the BeNI ensures unity and agreem.ent amons its members by 
focusing on issues common to aU of the monopoly fra.ction. A business interest group, 
within this contelt m.ust be small in size in order to achieve common objectives 
amongst aU its members and to mate the m.ost effident and effective u. of its 
resources. be they human. technological. or material Consensus is also easier to 
achieve in a small organization such as the BeNI since all mem.bers receive equal 
benefits by incurring the same costs. Hence, Finlayson's argument that the 
interesting to note is La.n.glUe·s contention that while the Busin.ess Council has 
in.cluded members of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. the Canadian Manufadurers' 
Association and the CoJ1seiJ till .PM.roJ'JaJ till ()ue!mc to participate on its policy 
committee. he finds the conciliation of groups with such divergent interests difficult to 
comprehend ,13 Several points of contention are evident in this analysis. 
The rationality of the Council's uniting with the fore-mentioned non-monopoly 
capital business orluizations is questionable in two respects. First, what wiU tend to 
appear in this instance is the "free rider" problem dis(;ussed under the public choice 
paradigm in Chapter Two. RecaU that the buie arlument of the "free .rider" problem is 
that if a business organization does not have a smaJ.1. cohesive, focused group of 
members, it faces the risk of inefficient and ineffective use of resources or benefits to 
be gained. In the cue of monopoly capital. this is exacerbated since its membership 
has a greater stake in maintaining the Sl8llIS'IUD in its favour within state monopoly 
capitalism than does non-monopoly capital. Furthermore. the monopoly capital 
fraction. has fewer members than the non-monopoly capital fractions so that its 
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hegemonic dominance through dialogue without the state's coercive and legitimating 
functions is unlikely. Indeed, if the BeN! did promote such hi-lateral co-operation with 
non~monopoly fractions. it would be shooting itself in the foot. One of the reasons 
monopoly capital is able to maintain hegemonic dominance over non-monopoly capital 
fractions is because the latter's interests are disjointed and competitive amongst 
themselves. 
Second. wgiUe's reasoning impHes that an on-going alliance between 
monopoly capital vis-a-vis non-monopoly capital business interest groups may be 
difficult to achieve since each fraction's concerns and resources are different. 
Unfortunately. wgille does not. take into account that it is precisely this dichotomy 
between monopoly and non-monopoly fractions that is one of the conceptual buUding 
blocb upon which state monopoly capitalism is founded. Furthermore. wgiUe cwms 
that another factor which makes compatibility bet.ween monopoly capital and non-
monopoly capital interests unlikely is that the latter groups' interactions with the state 
tend to be more overt and "ham-handed" than the BCNI.14 What. is at issue in this 
analysis is not so much the specific interests of each capitalist fraction. 1»1''' but 
n.ther the structure used to aggregate and articulate its memben' co.r:Uierns to the state. 
Business interest groups, such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce or the Canadian 
Federation of Independen.t Business. that represent the concerns of the non-mon.opoly 
ca.pital fractions. are referred to in the literature as "fledgling" or, at best, "mature" 
interest groups. However, such an interest ,roup as the BeNI is ca.te,or.ized under the 
heading of an "institutionalized It interest group. 
On A. Paul Pross' continuum framework for categorizing pressure groups, aD. 
institutionalized interest group is the pinn.ade of organization. Pross writes that aD. 
institutionalized interest group has aD. organizational structure that is a "responsive, 
adaptive ar,anism" which .reflects a particu1a..r philosophy and a HD.se of u.a.ity.15 
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It.!. the cue of the BeNt the sense of unity and a particular philosophy of its members 
are combined in the group's mandate of effectively representing the concer.ns of the 
monopoly capitaJ fraction with reference to the state's policy-setting agenda. In order 
for the Business Council to accomplish this, it must have an expert staff able to 
articulate the m.embers' interests to both the government. and the c.iviJ service on a 
continuing basis. Communication with the government is media-o.riented with a public 
relations app.roach emphasainl im.qe-buUdinl ads ud p.ress releases. t 6 The Council's 
efforts in this a.rea p.resent a polished. lOW-key. mional perspective of how the big 
business inte.rest is synonymous with the "national i.nterest". A good example of this 
includes the recent BeNI pubUcation, "Eco.nomic Strength and Political Stability 
lnsepa.rable Imperatives", which is i.ndicative of the organization's philosophy that a 
dynamic economy (serving the accumulation needs of capitalists) can only elist in a 
politically stable environment) ., 
Another hallmark of an institutionalized interest group, according to Pross. is 
the extensive human and financial resources yis-a.-yis mature or fledgling 
o.rganizWons.16 However. this assumption tends to be general in nature and needs to 
be qualified. For example. according to tangiUe's figures. the BeNI's budget wu 
approximately one miUlon dollars (circa. 1987). as compared to sil million dollars for 
the Canadian Federation of IndepeBdent Busi.ness (crIB) with 64,000 members. or $2.4 
milHon for the Cha.mber of Commerce with 140,000 members.l 9 What is at issue here is 
not the amount of resources at the organiuUoA's disposal to perpetuate its members' 
interests, but rather lu.,,. efleetlvel,. the .l'e.urees are UR'. For example, the 
BeN! is able to accomplish a lot more 'With its smaller budset. md staff thm other 
groups since its unified and agreed upon mandate is translated into an orgu.awon 
that uses its resources in a more efficient and focused manne.r. The o.rlaBaation Wld 
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membership size are both small ensuring good bi-lateral communication. The 
argument can also be made that the Business Council aust make effective use of its 
human and financial resources because. if it fails to do so, U. will be unable to defend its 
members' interests of accumulation and hegemonic dominance over other competing 
fractions and classes. 
The Business Council is also able to use its centralized orga.n.izational structure 
advantageously. There is only one "head office" for the organization so that 
communication is direct bet.ween administration and members. This is in contrast to 
such a. "mature" ,rouP as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. whose organ.izational 
structure includes offices at the local. regional. and national levels. Similarly. such a. 
"fledgling" group as the crIB faces the task. of serving 64.000 members whose interests 
are diversified and competitive. Achieving my effective level of consensus and 
agreement through objectives which. serve the parochial not collective concerns of its 
members tends to be difficult. Put of the problem lies in the inherent competition 
among non-monopoly fractions which is translated into their interest group 
organization. 
Finally, the level of access to politicians and civil Hrvants that each group 
attains must be considered.20 Pross categorizes institutionalized interest groups as 
having "regulu" (i.e .. ongoing) contact with both elected officials and bureaucrats. 
What needs to be emphasized in this context. is that the interaction is only with senior 
pUblit: serva.nts and politicians, who set. the state's potiey agenda by formulating and 
implementing public policy. The organization's members may a.1so appear and/or 
directly participate on government advisory boards or committees. For example. the 
Business Council in Apri11990 presented its members' views in. a statemen.t before the 
Special Committee of the House of Commons on the Companion Resolution to the Meech 
Lake Accord en.titled "The Meech Lake Accord and Constitutional Renewal". Pross also 
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stresses the importance of staff exchange between the private sector and public sector 
organizations. Earlier in the discussion, it was indicated that the BeN!'s current 
President and CEO once worked for Trudeau's PMO. Finlayson states that the Council's 
inte.ra.ctions with the Treasury Board is limited to improving public sector efficiency 
by transferring personnel from the private sector into the lovernment.21 Recall 
Miliband's neo-Marxist. instrumental argument in Chapter Three that members of the 
business community "colonize" strategic positions within the state i.n order to 
accommodate their capitalist interests. Through the regular and dose contact an 
institutionalized aroup maintains with state offidals. it is able to find out not only how 
the system works but how to exploit it to its members' advantaae. In can ins!, mature 
interest groups maintain relula.r contact but probably only with dvU servants 
involved in the routine administ.ration of implementing policies.22 Fledgling interest 
groups are in a "twilight zone". Characterized by confrontational interactions with 
politicians and officials on certain occasions. while in other circumstances. they have 
more regular contact with officials. The discussion now turns to a brief andysis of 
interest Iroups' functions and how these functions are embodied.in an institutionalized 
organization such as the BeNI. 
INTEREST GRoUP fUMC'OONS 
1) ~A1'IOII 
Although interest groups are sometimes abo caUed lobby or pressure groups 
and represent a myriad of concerns, they all share one common attribute. These 
groups seek to influence the state's policy-ma.king function so that it will refled their 
memberships' concerns.23 The groups diverge on the resources ava.ilable to them and 
how effectively they utilize these .resources to mate their interests known to the state. 
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Clearly, if an interest group hopes to influeAte public poUcy to favour its 
members' concerns, it is crucial to communicate with officials of the state, be they 
politicians or civil servants. The fora of the communication undertaken by the 
organization with t.he state will vary with the type of interest Iroup.2i An 
institutionalized Iroup such u the BeNI must use the resources at its disposal to 
articulate the interests of the monopoly capital fraction to the state in a cohesive 
manner both interna.11y and externally. To favour the concerns of one sector over 
another means that its interactions with the state are reduced to the competitive 
bickering fO\.Uld in non-institutionalized bu,iness interest groups. In essence, the 
Business Council attempts to focus the concerns of iUl members towards broad policy 
issues that maintain consensus internally and hesemonic dominance of the monopoly 
capita.1 fraction externally. According to Finlayson: 
"We're not interested in four hundred issues and forty-seven 
government departments. We have a limited staff, limited budget and 
our members look to us to do a limited number of thinss. They look to us 
to influence sovernment poUcy in areas that are critical to the business 
commu.o.ity nationally. And that's what we focus our guns on. We don't 
let lost in all the miuma and details that a lot of other groups, because of 
the nature of their constituency, na.ve to contend with. "25 
The form of communication an interest Iroup uses must. articulate the concerns 
of its members in a united fuhion. This objective is facilitated by the structure of an 
institutional Iroup.26 Such an interest group has a sense of continuity and cohesion 
which is, subsequently, also shared by its members. This amounts to a sense of stability 
regudinl policy objectives that other interest groups la.ck. ObjectiVes are focused and 
substantive yet broad enOUln to be able to "bugain" with the state over specific gains. 
As a. pre-cursor to communicating with. the government, an effective interest group 
must be a.ble to communicate with and amo.o.lst its members in order to articulate issues 
to the state: 
"Because that really is the critical challenge of running an association, 
to c: ••• uudc:ate with your members, perhaps to educate them to a 
limited extent but to try a.n.d refled their views and priorities. That is 
the critical management challenle in the association field, knowing 
what your members think and beinl able to represent. their interests 
effectively. The ,overnment wants all business associations to be able to 
effectively articulate what the concerns of their members are so that. 
government knows what. it's dealing with. The ,overnment can ,et a 
sense of' what industry wants and then make a decision on what type of 
response, if any, they're goinl to make."2? 
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What is interesting to note in the above quotation is the use of the term "to educate". 
When asked to darify and expand on the use of this term. Finlayson equated it with 
reachin, a consensus between members of the BCNI.26 Equally important, however. to 
obtaining agreement amona the business interest ,roup's members is the legitimation 
function of the organization. 
II) lSll11llATKJN 
The second major function that all interest groups. including the BCNI)a.ttempt 
to accomplish is legitimation of their concerns.29 What is important to note in this 
context is that legitimation can be a bH.ateral process between the civil service and the 
business interest group. From one aspect, an interest. group such as the BeNI may be 
inst.rumental in convincing poUcy makers and the populate that changes in public 
poUcy accommodate not only the needs of the organization's members but also the 
"public: interest",30 But as the author's model suggests, legitimation can also be 
achieved by maintaining acceptance and unity ot a specific pubUc poUcy that may run 
counter to certain monopoly capital fraction interests. The following discussion deals 
with how this bi-laterallegitimation function is achieved through the structure of the 
Business Council. 
Recall that the author's neo-Marxist paradigm on business-government 
relations defines an interest group such as the BeNI as being a "parallel bureaucracy" 
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cha..nu;teristics and functions. Both are permanent orlMiza.tions whose power is based 
upon expertise and knowledge, and whose raison d'iln is to articulate and reflect the 
"public i.nterest" or the "general business interest". For both organizations. 
legitima.t.ion is a means of bringing about consensus through beinl responsive to the 
needs of their respective constituencies. The Business Council functions to address 
members' concerns through the following two ways. Fint. the BeNI has a "Policy 
Committee". analogous to a corporation's Board of Governors. This Committe,'s 
membership is made up of representatives of resource, manufacturing. fiiulllce and 
foreign multi-national interests which meet six to ten times throughout the year to 
articula.te their collective concerns to either d'Aquino or Finla.yson. A meeting of the 
Business Council's full membership taltes place twice a year, once in Torol1io and once 
in Montreal, and provides another opportunity for a larger number of members to 
voice their concerns to the organization's administration. Second, Finlayson stresses 
the importance of using polls as a means through which members can express their 
needs. 
"Over the last year, we have begun to poll them periodically on specific 
issues that are of concern to the Council. We have poUed them on United 
States-Canada. Free Trade. environment issues, on Meech Lake and a 
couple of other controversial issues in order to let a sense ourseives 
what our members think and also to communicate back to them what 
their counterparts think. "31 
What is essential to understand in the above quotation is Finlayson's assertion 
that the BeNI acts as a sort of feedback and buffer mecha.o,lsm, maintaining consensus 
among the potentially conflicting concerns of its members. Again. this is indicative of 
an institutionalized business interest group in that legitimation focuses on being 
responsive to members' concerns without overtly favouring the COl'u::erns of one 
specific sector. jJer Sf/I. Within this context. Langme's contention tha.t the BeNI is an 
association of monopoly capital whose policy directives articulate the exclusive 
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interest.$ ot the hegemonic fraction. i.e., finance capitaJ.led by the chartered banks. is 
rather arbitrary and unconvincing.32 
For both the civil service and an institutionalized interest group such as the 
BCNt legitimation sometimes involves dealins with irreconcilable conflicts. In other 
words. the post neo-Mar:dst form and function of the state argument,33 put forth by 
Flatow and Huisken that the state not only nneets conflict amon, oocial institutions 
but actually e •• 8dies it can be analogous to the legitimation function of the Business 
Council vis-ii-vis its members. Fin.ta.yoon says that usually the BeNI is able to reoolve 
conflict amons its members through continuous dialogue amons the organization's 
policy committee or issue gtoUps . 
..... But we do see oome conflict obviously. And when conflict occurs. 
conflict being differences of opinion or priority [as} we have seen on 
trade issues, we see it on macroeconomics. we see it on the environment. 
When we have a conflict, we try and have one of our committees or issue 
groups ,rapple with the issue in some detail. We would put 
representatives from different view points on the committee 00 that the 
players at the table would represent the diver,ent issues that exist and 
we would hammer out a consensus position. Usually. you're able to do 
that. "34 
On other occuio.ns when internal qreement amonlst the members becomes 
impossible, the BeNI serves as a. damage control mechanism, ensuring that internal 
conflict is minimal and does not take precedence over consensus. 
"Sometimes you can't achieve consensus and when that happens. you 
have two choices. Either you don't tate a position on the issue which 
happens from time to time or more freque.nUy, you do tate a position but 
simply recognize that you're going to have a. few members upset. And of 
course. it would have to be a. situation where only a. small number of 
members Cett uncomfortable with the position 'We took."35 
The above quotation lends itself to further consideration. Within. this context. Claus 
Offe's hierarchical filter system, discussed in the previous chapter, mentions 
ideological mechanisms. Ideological mechanisms specify which issues are formally 
acknowled,ed by the state and thus p.ta.ced on the policy qenda for consideration. . 
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Similarly, recall Bachrach aBd Bum', concept of "non-decision-mati.ng" , I.n both 
instances, the exclusion of a specific policy issue is a method of achieving consensus 
aBd stability. The majority of this activity is performed by the civil service in being 
selectively responsive to only those interests within society which maintain capitalist 
dominance under the f~ of the "common good". Can this same logic be extended 
and applied to an institutionalized interest group such as the BCNI in that it. selectively 
does not acknowledge certain issues if they present. a threat to the overall consensus 
and stability of its membership? This question can be approached in two different 
ways. One argument that might be made is that the Business Council's position 
embodies the classical liberal creed of protecting individual rights and freedoms 
8,.8,last the t.yranny of the majorit.y. Unfortunately, this reasoning lends itself to a 
terwn amount of ambiguity since it is not explicit whether the minority views refer to 
the elite position held by the monopoly capital fraction ris-a-ris other fractions and 
classes within society or the minority views within the fraction's business interest 
group? A more convincing argument might emphasize that the BeNI ensures that 
there are no areas of dissension that might be exploited by its opponents. i.e., the non-
monopoly capital fractioJls or the working class. 
Thus far, the discussion on legitimation has primarily focused upon articulating 
monopoly capital issues which reflect unity aBd agreement of the business interest 
group's members to the state. However, the author's neo-Marxist paradigm on business-
lovernment relations also suggests that the business interest organlution legitimates 
policies formulated and implemented by the state to the group's members. This is 
particularly crucial if a specific policy runs counter to the interests of oae or several 
members of the monopoly capital fraction. The business interest group may 
experience strain in mailltaininl cohesiveness of its membership while 
simultaneously makinl a particular state-generated policy palatable. 
For example. Finlayson claims that: 
"On U.S,-wada Free Trade, we had a number of members who were 
concerned about the agreement. A luge majority favoured it. But the 
food processing industry was concerned about the impact of the Free 
Trade Agreement. They were arguing that a Free Trade Agreement with 
the United States in the absence of some other changes would be 
something hud for them to live with. The position that we eventuaUy 
took in the Business Council u a. result of input from these sectors wu a 
compromise. We continued to support Free Trade strongly but we 
publidy took the position that the government had an obligation to dea.l 
with the problems facing the food processing industry. which primarily 
had to do with higher input costs in Canada because of the marketing 
boards we have. "36 
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Even though the majority of the Business Council's members supported the Free 
Trade Agreement. the food processing industry was afraid that it would not be "playing 
on a level field" with its American. counterpart. The American. food processing 
industry did not have to contend with marketing boards. Consensus and unity were 
guaranteed by the Free Trade Agreement since most of the monopoly capital interests 
benefited from it. Since opposing its impieme.o.tation would .o.ot be prudent, for reasons 
noted in the following chapter. the BCNI sought to mue amendments in order to make 
the Agreement more palatable to the food processing indUStry. What is interesting to 
note is how the business interest group accomplished this, In effect, the Business 
Council was able to achieve interna.l agreeme.o.t and perpetuate the classical liberal 
creed of " laissez-faire" (the lovernment that rules least rules best) by insist-inl the 
state Umit the power that regulatory agencies. i.e" marketing boards. have in 
indirectly controlling monopoly capital activities. Even though the food processing 
industry did not originally favour the Free Trade Agreement. the opportunity it 
presented in reducing input costs by limiting the authority of marketing bauds. made 
the policy attractive to its long-rangE! goals of accumulation and hegemonic 
dominance pis-a.-pis non-monopoly capital fractions. As will be seen in Chapter Five, 
the monopoly capital fraction uses a similar argument with regards to the 
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government's proposed environmental proUidion policy. 
This chapter has focused on the organizational structure of perhaps the most 
eHtist yet least weil-known Canadian business interest group. the Business Council on 
National Issues. It has outlined briefly the evolution of the Council from a small group 
of unfocused big business interests. iU-equipped to internet effectively with politicians 
ud civil servants to a cohesive. sophisticated institutionalized interest group. able to 
articulate its members' concerns to the state. Its ability to do this is bued on 
maintaining unity and agreement of its memben through the "general business 
in Uirest" . Although the organization's staff and budget are relatively small compared 
to "fledgling" or "mature" interest groups; (most likely to represent non-monopoly 
capital fraction concerns) individuals Uke d'Aquino and finlayson know how the 
government operaUis and use this knowledge to target strategic political and 
bureaucratic officials. 
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CHAPTER FIYE: 
POUCY SCOPE Of THE BUSINESS COUNCil ON NATIONAL ISSUES 
This chapter concentrates on how the consensus achieved through the 
structure of the Business Council on National Issues is translated into policy concerns 
and recommendations presented to the state. Recall that the author's neo-Marxist 
paradigm of business-governm.ent relations emphasizes Gramsd's concept of 
hegemony. The importance of hegemony is the ability to be responsive to "popular 
interests" (read: those of the masses) as a means of maintaining ed perpetuating the 
sl8tus quo. The foundations of the sllUus quo are the same ones that determine the 
dominance of the hegemonic f.ra.ct1on, i.e., accum.ulation and legitimation. 
Furthermore, the role of hegemony, according to Gramsd, is set within the context of 
ail inherently unstable and fragile system of political relations. Jessop's analysis 
elaborates on Gramsci's concept of hegemony by relating it to the hegemonic project. 
Jessop contends that the hegem.onic project attempts to bring about consensus 
between different and conflicting specific and general interests. Such Canadian 
"national interest" poUdes as the " Free T.rade Agreement", the " Meech Lake Accord", 
the "Goods and Services Tu" and environmental protection polides explicitly or 
implicitly advance the long term interests of the dominant monopoly capital f.ra.ction. 
Although Jessop analyzes the hegemonic project within the framework of the civil 
service, the author wiU argue in this chapter that this function can also be adopted by 
a business interest group such as the OCNI. As the following discussion reveals, the 
Business Council formulates hegemonic projects as a m.ethod of ensuring agreement 
and unity amongst its membership as weH as maintaining its hegemonic dominance. 
In the article, "The Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian State", 
Langille quotes Thomas d'Aquino, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the BeNt 
as saying that the business interest group is a means through which its membership 
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have opted to It contribute personally to the development of public policy and to the 
sh.aping of national priorities" ,1 The shaping of these national priorities translates 
into the Business Council on National Issues not concerning itself with the myriad of 
ministries or agencies that comprise the state. Instead, it will concentrate its efforts on 
articulating a specific policy approach that serves to effect certain crucial state 
activities,2 What is important to understand here is the stope of government policy --
Le., what is and is not included in the state's agenda setting process -- that the business 
interest group attempts to influence,3 Recall Finla.yson '5 assertion in the previous 
chapter that the Business Council on National Issues "does not concern itself with four 
hundred issues and forty-seven government departments".4 Instead, Finlayson 
emphasizes: 
"The BCNI's involvement in the policy process is an overall attempt to 
influence the direction the government takes and in some cases the 
specific content of the policies chosen. "5 
For example, one of the Business Council's national priorities is its obsession 
with the federal government's budget deficit. This policy concern is interpreted as a 
creed that the government should apply cut-backs to universal social programs such as 
family allowances and old age pensions (which currently make up the major portion of 
the budget's allocation "pie"), and reduce government waste through "unnecessary" 
administration (read: CUl"w1inS the poyer and aut.hority state relutatory 
agendes have in contl"oilins monopoly capital activities). The discussion in 
the previous chapter pointed out how the food processing interest within the monopoly 
capital fraction was able to limit the power of such regulatory agencies as marketing 
boards (e,g., maintaining "artificially high" costs of raw materials) under the auspices 
of the Free Trade Agreement. As this chapter contends, the BeNI puts forth a similar 
argument with regard to the government's proposed environmental protection plan. 
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protection plM, Often, regulatory agencies are a mechanism that ensure that the 
companies within a specific industrial sector. both monopoly capital and non-
monopoly capital, compete "on a level play1nl field", Limiting the authority of 
regulatory alencies is a way of destroyinl the equilibrium of a "perfectly competitive 
market" in favour of the monopoly capital fraction and thereby !nsurinl hegemonic 
dominance. Also. privatizing crown corporations is seen as a way of minimizing 
"unfair" competition by the public sector with the private sector. Notice how these 
apparently diverse policy initiatives are joined together in articulating the "public 
interest" towards "fiscal responsibility" and, furthermore, how the "public interest" 
becomes intertwined with the "general business interest", in that both serve to 
maintain accumulation and hegemonic dominance for the monopoly capital fraction. 
Similarly, Finlayson states that the policy committee of the BeNI defines 
"horizontal" issues of concern that affect the national business community as a whole.6 
Macroeconomic issues, for e:zample, involve such concerns as inflation, exchange 
rates, unemployment, fiscal policy. the whole question of the deficit, and federal-
provincial fiscal relations. Tax policy issues encompass such things as the general 
sales tax policy in Canada, the overall level of taxation. the design of the corporate 
income tax system, and, the compotitiveneSi of the Canadian ta.:z system judled alainst 
this country's leading trade partners. International trade and economic iSiue, reflect 
such polities as Free Trade with not. only the United States but also Meneo, Canada's 
involvement with the European Economic Community, as weU as our economic 
relationship with Japan, The final policy area exami.ned here COJlcerns the realm of 
environmental protection, Wit.hin the context of an environmental protection poUcy, 
the BeNI's membership favours methods of compliance which reflect the invisible 
hand of the mar,bt economy and not the iron-fisted authority of government 
regulatory activities, 
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NOJle of these policy categories reflects the exclusive concerns of such 
monopoly capital sectors as resources. manufactu.dng. finance. or toreilll investment. 
Instead, these policy concerns attempt to bring about consensus a..nd cohesiveness 
amonl the BCNI's membership. This is the framework. through which such national 
interest hegemonic projects as the " Free Trade Agreement", the " Goods and Services 
Tu". the " Meech Lake Accord", and environmental protection policy wiU be analyzed. 
THE FREE 'TRADE AGREEMENT 
Langille asserts that t.he major impetus for the Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States originated with the Business Council on National Issues.? The monopoly 
capital interests needed guaranteed access to luger mukets a..nd this could not be 
accomplished without help from the Canadian state. The Free Trade Agreement is a 
salient factor in bringing about consensus regarding hegemonic dominance of 
monopoly capital yjs-a.-yjs non-monopoly capital fractions within a national context. 
From an international perspective. the Free Trade Agreement is a method by which the 
Canadian monopoly capital fraction ca..n compete viably with other countries' 
monopoly capital fractions. 
Since the early 1980's, the BeNI has been a vocal and ardent supporter of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the United States. In such speeches as 
'''Truck and Trade with the Yankees', The Case for a Canada--U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement", BeNI President and CEO, Thomas d'Aquino, argues eloquently for the 
benefit$ to be gained by Canadians through a more libera.lized trade policy.a These 
include securing access to important American market$, significantly raising 
employment and income levels. strengthening national unity (by abolishing such 
provincial non-tariff trade barriers as subsidies, which accentuate Canada's regionalist 
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tendencies> a.nd bews a foundation for other agreements on an international scale. 
What is interesting to note about the Business Council's contention that the Free T.ra.de 
Agreement could be a model for future trade policies is t.hat. it opposes a. customs union 
between the United States and Canada.9 A customs union inhibits trade participation by 
third cou.otries such as Mexico. 
The Business Council extols the advantages of a Free Trade Agreement by 
pointing out that Canada would otherwise by unable to partake of the U.S. Government's 
procureme.ot market. estimated to be worth seven hundred and fifty billion dollars and 
a potential for ~.OOO new jobs.10 There are two major problems with this proposition. 
First, only monopoly capital interests have the fwancial clout to effectively lobby 
American politicians and thereby obtain lucrative government contracts. Second. one 
wonders at how receptive Am.erican monopoly capital lobby groups would be to 
Canadian interests potentiaUy threatening their "special relationship" with the U.S. 
Government. The situation is emcerbated since the American corporations would view 
Canadian contract bids as interference and unfair competition in terms of Canadian 
companies receiving subsidies from their federal government. 
The BeNI also claims that another advantage of Free Trade is in substantially 
improving Canada's abysmal productivity a.chievements in the industrialized world.! I 
Under the auspices of the Free Trade Agreement, industries becom.e more specialized 
and therefore more efficient. Again, the rhetoric contained in this argument reflects 
the self-serving purposes of the monopoly capital fraction since specia.lization in this 
context is synonymous with accumulation through high levels of production and 
corporate concentration: non-monopoly capital fraction industries do not have access 
on a large scale basis to fa.ctors of production such as na.tural resources (including 
landl, labour. and capital to compete effectively with monopoly capital industries. 
a6 
From the point of view of Cwada's domestic: economy. the Free Trade A,reement 
with the United Sta.tes presented an opportunity to preserve monopoly capital·s position 
of hegemonic dominance by eroding the interprovincial trade barriers which 
favoured the non-monopoly capital fractions. 12 This effort at maintaining consensus 
between the business interest group '5 members also provided a crucial legitimation 
function. The legitimation function was directed to a certain extent towards the 
general public through the Free Trade Agreement's rhetoric that exposing Canada's 
domestic industries to more international competition would result in consumers 
paying lower prices. However, the legitimation function would be even more crucial to 
the non-monopoly fractions since changes brought about by the free Trade Agreement 
would affect their levels of productivity. efficiency, wd competitiveness. Essentially, it 
attempted to act as a sort of damage control between federal-provincial conflicts. The 
conflicts between the two echelons of government. arose since the Free Trade 
Agreement threatened the protection provincial subsidies created for BOB-monopoly 
fractions, ie., small and medium-sized businesses, yis-a-vis the monopoly capital 
fraction. The BeNI argued that these provincial subsidies distorted market efficiellcy 
and competitiveness: 
" ... on the brewing industry. we took the position. that if the brewing 
industry was going to be included in the free Trade Agreement. it would 
be necessary to allow that industry to restructure its Canadian operations 
which essentially meant dosing down a lot of p.ta.nts that are small in the 
various provinces and operate with a smaller number of larger plants so 
that they would be more competitive. more productive, and let 
economies of scale." 13 
The implications of the Free Trade Agreement must also be eumined from an 
international perspective. Canada's monopoly capital fraction was influellced to a 
IRat extent by economists' logic that the country's productivity potential was being 
hindered by our small market size and market scale.li This Hne of reasoning dictated 
that a lUler market .. obtained under the auspices of the Free Trade AgreemeBt, would 
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be translated into increased levels of productivity. However. another crucial factor in 
the push towards Free Trade wu the European Economic Community's impending 
unification in 1992:.1 5 The power that the European economic agreement could yield 
acted as a catalyst for consensus and unity for North American monopoly capital. 
Furthermore, the Free Trade Agreement served as a type of economic defense against 
the new European reality. 
Langille, in his analysis of the attempts by business interest groups to secure a 
Free Trade Agreement, indicates that it is rather ironic that the negotiations took place 
at a time of heightening protectionism on Amerita's part.16 However, the author 
argues that it was not 00 much a case of irony than necessity on the part of Canadian 
capital which saw Free Trade as a way to exempt Canada. from the possible effects of 
protectionism whUe simultaneously broadening export and investment interests inw 
America.. The ea.Us for a protectionist trade potiey by the U.S. Government originated 
from the America.n non-monopoly competitive sector, which feared that under the Free 
Trade Agreement, Canadian monopoly capital interests would have an unfair advantage 
in the American domestic market. Higb. interest rates in the United States have 
increa.. . d the value of the American dollar. The result was an unbalanced U.S. Trade 
Sheet. encouraging imports, which became relatively cheaper than U.S. products. a.nd 
making American exports relatively more expen.sive. and therefore less competitive 
internationdly, 
However, it is mislelding to assume that the high interest rates in America. 
which led to a. trade deficit for U.S. exports in international markets. were solely 
responsible for hastening Free Trade negotiations between the United States and 
Canada. The fundamental underlying reason for establishin.g a. bilateral trade 
agreement between Canada and the United States was that Canadian monopoly capital 
had reached the point of maximum growth potentia.! within our relatively smaU 
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domestic market.. Further expansion inw other mukets (such as the U.S') by the 
Canadian monopoly capital fraction was a necessity if it was to maintain accumulation 
and hegemonic dominance. Therefore. the BeNI may have interpreted the Free Trade 
Agreement as a means to guarantee opportunities for the expansion of monopoly 
capital by increasing access to such international markets as America and. more 
recently. Mexico. at the expense of other fractions and dasses. 
What is interesting to note in this instance is the BeN! 's current policy 
ncommendation to include Mexico in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.1 7 
Could the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico be a means to secure and broaden the 
multi-national manufacturing interests of the Canadian monopoly capital fraction by 
not limiting investment to the high interest rate market of America ptu' #? Extendins 
the Free Trade Agreement to indude Mexico would offer such benefits to the 
manufacturing sector as a relatively larse pool of indigenous labour available, thereby 
drivins down the cost. of labour which is particularly crucial to such a labour-
intensive industry as manufacturing. and the dose proximity to American and 
Canadian markets, resulting in lower transportation costs. The influx of Mexican 
manufactured products into Canada also means that the monopoly capital fraction will 
be able to maintain its hegemonic dominance over the non-monopoly manufadurina 
fractions since they will not be able to compete effectively without provincial product 
tariffs or subsidies. which the Free Trade Agreement eliminates. The monopoly capital 
fraction is also able to subdue the efforts of the working <:lass to push for Maher wage 
rates, since the Free Trade Agreement makes a decrease in. indigenous labour costs an 
inevitability to remain competitive with imports. However, the manufacturing interest 
of the monopoly capital fraction is not the only sector to benefit from the Free Trade 
Agreement. 
The .resources sector of the monopoly capital fraction sains the advantase of 
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increased access to a larger market through the Free Trade Agreement.l 8 Higher 
export quotas for such. Canadian energy products as oil, natural gu, electricity, and 
uranium are a direct result of the federal government phasing out the national e.nergy 
program. The gover.nment's radical shift to a more" laissez-fai" " attitude towards 
energy consumption and exports maintains monopoly capital hegemonic dominance in 
the following respects. First. the new policy regarding resources explicit in the Free 
Trade Agreement means that the priority for domestic energy supplies has shifted from 
the manufacturing firms of the Canadian industrial hearUalld, i.e., small and medium-
sized businesses of the non-monopoly capital fractions, to the more lucrative American 
markets. Secondly. the increased overhead costs and the financing of future 
exploration and production involved in higher levels of energy exports means that 
small and medium.-sized companies will be squeezed out of the m.arket by large 
conglomerates. As with the eHmination of provincial subsidies and tariffs. the rhetoric 
of this energy polity involves treating a market that is more competitive. efficient. 
and productive. Finally, the current "Gulf Crisis" between Iraq and Kuwait w.i11 
inevitably allow the energy producers of the monopoly capital fraction to increase 
prices for domestic and elPort consumption. Although the author realizes that this 
could not have been foreseen by the BCNI at the time the Free Trade Agreement was 
negotiated. it is stin a salient point to consider. 
Ironica.l1y, one of the interests within t.he monopoly capital fra.ction that 
benefits from the Free Trade Agreement is Corehlln investment.. Thomas d'Aquino 
asserts that in "non-restricted" sectors. the limits placed upon foreign ta.k.e-overs by 
the review clause of the Free Trade Agreement have been ra.ised over time to exempt 
acquisitions of less than one hundred and fifty million doUan for direct take-oven.l 9 
While this in no way threatens the holdings of other monopoly capital interests. it does 
provide an effective method of increasing foreign ownership of non-monopolY capital 
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fraction businesses. Furthermore. indirect take-overs by foreign investment groups do 
not come under the Free Trade Agreement's jurisdiction. Indeed, the BeNI readily 
admits t.hat the Free Trade Agreement is a means of at.tracting Japanese and other 
foreign investment to Canada.20 
Thus far, the discussion has centred on the means by which the Free Trade 
Agreement between Cuada and the United States (and. possibly, Mexico) has 
strengthened the consensus and hegemonic dominance of the monopoly ca.pital 
fraction. But the question that begs to be asked is: what classes or fractions bear the 
expenses? LangiUe. in his analysis. holds that the cost may be inflicted upon the 
working class in terms of decreasing wages and significant cuts in such public services 
and programs as .regional development, environmental protection.. health and safety. 
welfare. pension. and cuiture,21 In addition. the Free Trade Agreement acts to support 
the s/.llUs I/UO in perpetuating monopoly capital hegemonic dominance by dissolving 
provinciaJ. subsidies a.nd tariff regulations as well as makinl non-monopoly capital 
interests more vulnerable to foreiln take-overs. Essentially, the Free Trade 
Agreement. instead of bringing consensus to the competing non-monopoly fractions. 
merely polariZes one business aga.inst another in a. desperate attempt to remain 
profitable and indepen.dent. Very few survive in this more efficient and productive 
market economy -- most an victims of bankruptcy or take-overs. 
THE GOODs AND SERVICES TAl 
The proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST) faUs under wha.t the BeNl refers to as 
a "tax policy" horizontal issue, As with the Free Trade Agreement. the policy mandates 
that the BCNI stresses in. the Canadian state's implementation of the Goods and Services 
Tax include efficiency, competitiveness and consensus,22 In effect. the eST represen.ts 
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an attempt to establish economic stability as a corollary to political stability, i.e., the 
Meech Lake Accord. In other words, the GST attempts to maintain consensus in 
Canada's wation system by establishing a tax that will apply to all provinces just as the 
Meech Lake Accord attempted to bdng about agreement between the provinces by 
formally acknowledging Quebec's dlh! to a distinct society and thereby iadudingit in 
the Canadian Constitution. But, as the following analysis shows, the GST merely 
exacerbates the unequal structure inherent in the Canadiu taxation system. 
Maintaining the status ,uo through this particular tax policy also contributes to the 
hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction. 
In the discourse "Why Tax Reform is Vital to Canada's National Prosperit.y" , 
d'Aquino uws that members of the BCNI have been studying major reforms in our to 
system since at least 198-4.23 The Council considers its efforts to place tax reform, of 
'Which the GST is a pari, on the state's policy-settinG agenda as being "far-sighted" 
since neither the federal government nor many Canadians supported the idea. Despite 
this stumbling block. the BeNI was convinced that tax reform 'Was "inevitable" and 
furthermore that Canada's business community could not participate effectively in the 
implementation of the tax policy 'Without a dear, concise framework. Part of this 
frame'Work involves the legitimation function of resolving intergovernmental 
conffict,24 A comprehensive to reform policy can only be effective if the provincial 
governments support. the reforms and implement suitable support.ing policies, This 
point 'Will be elaborated on later in the discussion. 
LangiUe '$ anal'ysis of the Goods and Services Tax is convincing since he argues 
that the policy will reduce corporate taxes while enlarging the sales to.25 Coupled 
with broadening the tax base, the GST raises revenues that 'Will ostensibly aid in 
financing the budget defitit. The restructured to system will also mean a reduction of 
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the province's ability to tax corporatioJls.26 Lik.e the Free Trade Agreement. the 
framework of this policy explicitly assumes that any potential intergovernmental 
conflict regarding legitimation will be .resolved to maintain consensus and 
responsiveness in the interests of the monopoly capital fraction: 
"At the same time, the federal and provincial governments should come 
together again--and be locked in a room. if necessary--until lhey 
alree • .8 a siD.ltell. c.Rbined aaUoad &Ad ,teviscid .ale, W 
t.hat C&A It. euily uaderlleod aad celleded. "21 
The crucial point in this quotation is the BeNI's concern that the federal and 
provincial echelons of government co-ordinate their efforts in implementing a w 
which is easily comprehended and administered by business. But the problem is that 
the implementation of the GST by the different provinces does not amount to consensus 
but, rather, accentuates the inequality inherent in the Canadian taxa.tion system. The 
provinces have opted for two ways of implementing the Goods and Services Tu.28 The 
figures in Table 5.1 indicate that provinces such as Quebec, New Brunswick. Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward bland, and Newfoundland have dedded to "piggy back" their 
respective provindal sales wes on the price of goods after the OST has been applied, 
while other provinces such as British Columbia. Alberta. Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and 
Ontario will have a single, combined tax. 
Wha.t is interesting to note in this dichotomy. is that those provinces which wiU 
have a. single combined tax are not only accommodating the concerns of the monopoly 
capital fraction for such a tax, but are abo. coincidently, those provinces where the 
majority of big business interests are located. The figures in Table 5.1 also show that 
provinces impiementins the single w system wiU have lowe.r w rates than those 
provinces (with the exception of Quebec in 19(2) that wiU implement the OST by piggy 
backing it to the provincial sales tax. It is not very likely that either the monopoly 
capital fraction and non-monopoly capital f.ractions. wiU want to or have to contend 
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with both tuation. systems. According to Catherine Swift, Chief Economist of the 
CMadia..n Federation of Independent Business: 
"Industries having to deal with more thM one province wm go berserk:. 
Companies wiU have to keep different systems Md keep different t.ypes 
of books depending where t.heir store is. "29 
Essentially, the two-tier system proposed by the provinces for implementing the GST 
makes the administration of the tax for businesses that have to contend with both 
methods more cumbersome, and consequently, less streamlined and competitive. Even 
though both non-monopoly fractions and t.he m01'lopoly fraction inevitably have to 
deal with the two taxation systems, only big business has the technological and human. 
resources to adapt.30 
TAIL! 5.1 
-SAlES TAl RATES FOR 'Bit! PROYllCES AfTER 
IMPLEMENTATION Of 'THE FEDERAl GOODS AND SERVICES TAl (GST:r31 
PRO'INCE PROVIICW. 'MTHGST 
RATE Of.,. 
British Columbia 6% 13% 
Alberta 0% 7% 
Saskatchewan 7% 14% 
Manitoba 1% 14% 
Ontario 8% 15% 
Quebec- Now 9% 0% 
Provin cial tu - January 1. 1991 8% 15.'6% 
is applied on - January 1, 1992 1% 14.49% 
Goods and New Brunswick 11% 18.17% 
Services Tax Nova Scotia 10% 17.1% 
Prince Edward Island 10% 17.1% 
NewfoundlMd 12% 19.84% 
Source: Drew Fagan. "Different Tacks on the Tax." The GJoDe uri Alm1, 
(October 17, 1990), p.~1. 
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Canada.'s regionalism between "have" Wld "have not" provinces is also made 
more acute by the proposed implementat.ion of the GST by the provinces. The data 
contained in Table ,.1. for example, indicate that the Atlantic provinces. areas of high 
unemployment.. low industrial development. and whose citizens can least afford being 
wed twice, are hit hardest. By "piggy backing", the provincial sales won top of the 
price of goods after the GST has already been applied. the combined taxes will equal 
19.84%. in Newfoundland. "Have not" provinces such as New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland argue that they cannot afford to lose revenue by not piggy backing.32 
Newfoundland. for example, would lose twenty million dollan it if did not" piggy back" 
the two taxes. Total revenue from the provincial sales tu system would increase by 
$560 mUlion in the 1990-1991 fiscal year for Newfoundland. 
Although the Business Council is anxious to gei the proposed GST implemented 
in a universal method in all provinces, it is equally concerned with the tax policy 
creating an environment conducive to business expansion by lowering both 
government spending and high interest rates. The BeN!', obsession with cutting the 
deficit by curtailing government spending, which includes transfer payments from 
Ottawa to "have not" provinces, is indicative of classical liberalism's emphasis on 
"JaiSStM-flJinJ' government. In this context, the " JIIJ'ss8.I-fainJ' activity of government 
means that Canada's federal system is put in jeopardy since Ottawa and the provinces 
'Will no 10nser proportionately share in the responsibility of financing universal 
social proltrams. Essentially, under the proposed system, the .responsibility for 
providing financial assistance to the poor has shifted from the "have provinces" and 
the federal government to the "have not" provinces. In effect, the double tuation 
system of the provincial sales tu and the GST penalizes the citizens of the "have not" 
provinces for their poverty. 
One wonders how the citizens of the Atlantic provinces will benefit 
95 
substantively from the proposed "piggy back" t.u:ation system if they must 
simultaneously pay the most yet are the most in need? Is it 10gicI.1 for provinces such 
as Newfou.t1dland or New Brunswick to pay the GST when their provincial sales tax is 
already hiaher than. "have" provinces such as Ontario or British Columbia? The 
Busi.t1ess Council argues that imposing the GST universally on aU provinces promotes a 
fair and efficient tax system reform, although its members would prefer. in their own 
interests, the straight taxI.Uon system of "have ,Provinces" yjs-a.-yjs the "piggy back" 
system of "have not." provinces. 
The BeNI a.1so urges that the new tax policy ma.intain business tax breaks 
rega.rding the depreciation of business equipment and investment in research and 
development.33 Alain, these benefits are more libly to accommodate the long-term 
interests of the monopoly capital fraction yjs-a.-yis non-monopoly capital fractions. 
Nor are the non-monopoly capital fractions the only ones to bear the burden of this 
new tax policy. In implementing the 6ST, the government wants workers to accept a 
"one-time" 2.25' increase in inflation from the tax without demanding a similar 
increase in wages.34 
The implication of the Goods and Services Tax is paraHel to the Free Trade 
Agreement. in two respects. First. both policies attempt to maintain the monopoly 
capital's hegemonic position by creating a more competitive, efficient. and productive 
market economy at the expense of the non-monopoly capital fractions. Efficiency is 
established by implementing a tax policy that selectively eUminates those small and 
medium-sized businesses that cannot compete. Second, d' Aquino maintains that a major 
tax reform. which includes the 6ST, would hasten the further "harmonization" of the 
Cuadian and American tax systems given the extensive amount of bilateral trade and 
investment allowed under the free Trade Agreement.35 In effect, the "harmonization" 
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of the two countries' to: systems, along with bilateral free trade, a.re both incentives 
which promote common. levels of efficien.cy, greater productivity, and increased 
profits for American and Canadian monopoly capital fractions yiS-8-yis their non-
monopoly counterparts. The Conference Board of Canada insists that the replacement 
of the current Manufacturers' Sales Tu by the GST will mean a significut increase in 
Canadiu exports.36 Furthermore. the BCNI reflects the Conference Board of Canada', 
findings by stating: 
"The improved climate for capital investment and exports arisin.g from 
the removal of the Federal Manufacturers' Sales Tax (MST) in 1991 also 
should lead to better productivity performance, ,adi&ldul,. in the 
.alu.factoria, aad reHurees lecion. Economists have estim.ated 
that the combination of bilateral free trade and elimination of the MST 
could boost the productivity capacity of the Cuadian economy by 3-
4%."31 
This is because the OST, in effect, "internalizes" the tax that manufacturers 
would pay for exported products by shifting the cost of access to international markets 
onto the domestic economy. In other words. CUadians, by paying the Goods and 
Services Tax, are footing the biU for the monopoly capital manufacturing interests to 
expand their export capability and thereby secure accumulation ud hegemonic 
dominuce. SmaU wonder that the BCNt since 1985, bas been a proponent of replacing 
the existing narrowly based Manufacturers' Sales Tax with the broadly based Goods and 
Services Tax.30 
The irony contained in the GST is that the federal deficit that it is designed to 
payoff has been increased, to a luge extent. through tax expenditures granted to the 
monopoly capital fraction by the state. However, the BCN!'s perspective focuses not so 
much on the tax expenditure aspect of the budget deficit as creating a better, more 
simplified tamtion system ud thereby reducing the federal debt.39 For the Business 
Council. the two policies go hand in hud since a reformed tax polley would direct 
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federal revenues to "running" the government ( in a political and/or administrative 
sense?) and upholding certain national responsibiHties, while cutting back on certain 
government programs and thereby reducing the deficit. 
One of these responsibilities involves giving sodal security benefits only to 
those people who" really need" government assistance, i.e" true to dassical1ibera1ism, 
the BeNI would like to see welfare obligations transferred from the state to the 
individual:40 The "common good" embodied in universal social services becomes 
irrelevant and obsolete in this context. But, by directing federal social service 
expenditures to only really destitute individuals, the Council reasons that the budget 
deficit can be lowered by eliminating a lot of "free riders", However, one wonders 
what parameters the BeNI would use to measure an individual's destitution and need for 
social services, Where or how do the "working poor" fit into the Business Council '5 
scheme of things? 
The BCNI also advocates that pension. reform should not concentrate on 
expanding the government-sponsored Old Age Security Program, since this only adds to 
the federal deficit, but should rather rely on private sector options and voluntary 
individual arrangements,"!:1 These private sector options involve redirecting money 
away from state-sponsored pension plans into such monopoly capital interests as 
insurance companies, banks, and investment firms, Again, the question that begs to be 
asked is: do such private sector options provide universality in terms of being 
accessible} affordable, and available? 
THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD 
As stated previously, the BeNI connects economic strength with political 
stability, The consitutional amending formula is interpreted in terms of a 
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macroeconomic issue by the monopoly capital traction since it affects such things as 
the exchange rate and federal provincial fiscal relations. However, the failure of the 
Meech Lake Accord can affect the realm of internationa.l trade as well. Whether or not 
the Meech Lake Accord was ratified was of smaller consequence to the membership of 
the BeN! tha.n maintaining consensus and perpetuating the monopoly capital's 
hegemonic domina:Jl ee. 
The Business Council viewed the Meech Lake Accord as an opportunity for 
Canada. to get its political house in order through. intergovernm.ental co-operation and 
as a. means of establishing economic strength.i2 Ostensibly. the fore-mentioned 
intergovernmental co-operation is synonymous with consensus between Ottawa and 
the provinces. However, as the fo11oYin, discussion i11ustra.tes. the fnunework for this 
argument is limited and oriented towards the interests of monopoly capital. Perhaps 
the primary issue of consensus and responsiveness to which the Meech Lake Accord 
addressed itself was legitimizing Quebec's right to a distinct society within Canada. 
However, the BCNI tended to downplay the term "distinct" as being in some way more 
equal than others.43 The Meech Lake Accord also recognized and legitimized the 
federal 8overnment's prerogative to control more directly its fiscal relationship with 
the provinces: 
"It is wrong to maintain that the Accord decentralizes in favour of the 
provinces to the point of overly weakening the redem system. On the 
contrary, for the first time. it gives the federal government the pover to 
spend money in areas of provincia.l jurisdiction. "-44 
Such areas might include making previously unconditional federal1oa.ns and 
grants to the provinces more accountable and subject to Ottawa's scrutiny. ControUing 
the federal deficit and administrative waste is merely a policy I'~ the monopoly 
capital fraction adopts in eliminating non-competitive and inefficient government-
assisted business ventures. These provincially funded programs. like tariffs, benefit 
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the in.terests of supportin.8 region.al developmen.t (mainly non-monopoly ca.pital 
el'lterprises) within "have not" proviru::es a.t the e:tpen.se of the mon.opoly ca.pital 
fra.ction: 
"There is little evidence to suggest that in.dustrial regional developm.ent 
gra.n.ts are n.eeded to support ToJde business and investment 
adivity."45 
Although the Meech Lake Accord affected intergovernmental relations. its 
failure contains serious repercussions for both Ottawa and the provinces. The Business 
Council recognizes that the Meech Lake Accord's failure wiU result in 
intergovernmental (read: political) conflict.i6 However. the concerns of its members 
are not so much to the post-Meech Lake Accord political arra.n.gements as to 
perpetuating econom.ic consensus a.n.d viability: 
"The collapse of the Meech Late Accord throws into question the future 
of the Canadian. political system and the future of the Canadian common 
market. So for the coming year. one of the priorities we ha.ve identified 
is to try and have some influence on the thin.king of Canadian.s 141.1 the 
media. and politicians about how important it is to ,"_rve tile 
CaAuiu co •• oa .artet, regardless of what happens at the level of 
constitutionall4d political dialogue with Quebec. Quebec may separate. 
it may not. Wh.o knows?1 But our concern and the concern of our 
members. both with.in Quebec an.d outside. is to ensure that the common 
market will be preserved, regardless of the political a,rra.n.gements that 
may eventually develop.""? 
Finlayson's emphasis on preserving the Canadian common. market. regardless 
of the Meech Lake Accord negotiations' outcome, deserves further consideration. 
Recall that mon.opoly capital's hegemonic dominan.ce over other fractions and dasses 
depends on its ability to maintain consensus and unity amongst its members. The 
failure of the Meech Lake Accord may foreshadow not only political but also economic 
sovereignty for Quebec. Without a common market of monopoly capital interests 
between Quebec a.n.d the rest of Cuada. the hegemonic dominance of this fraction. wiU 
be threatened. 
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The lack of cohesion, i.e., the lack of a common market, between monopoly 
capital fraction interests means that the group's hegemonic dominance wiU be 
challenged by the non-monopoly capital fractions and the working class. Recall the 
author's proposition in the previous chapter that the BeNt as an organization, 
functions to acknowledge and articulate only those monopoly capital interests that 
ensure consensus, stability, and unity of its membership. Clearly, the Business Council 
must aggregate its membership towards a common objective, regardless of the Meech 
Lake Accord's political consequences, to maintain hegemonic dominance. The 
formation of a common market can be an objective which transcends the Accord's 
political tensions to provide a source of continued economic growth and strength for 
monopoly capital interests. For example, the ability of the monopoly capital frac:tioD to 
expand its production and investment capadUes will be hindered without. a common 
market. since ventures require the joint efforts of finance, resources, and 
manufact.uriDg interests. LasUy, the objectives of the monopoly capital fraction, i.e., 
ac:cumulaUoD and hegemonic dominance, must be focused OD ,roup, not individual, 
benefits. It would not be efficient or raUonal in economic terms to have the monopoly 
capital interests of Quebec compete with the rest of Canada's monopoly capital interests. 
Without a common market, the monopoly capital interests may end up becoming 
relionalized and competing with each other. a situation analogous to the non-
monopoly capital fractions. Eventually, competition leads to individual interests taking 
precedence over the common goal of hegemonic dominance, Clearly, the monopoly 
capital fraction's vested interests in perpetuating accumulation and hegemonic 
dominance for its members must transcend the inherent conflict of the Meech Lake 
Accord's failure, in order to maintain consensus. 
The macroeconomic effects on the monopoly capital fraction's interests must 
also be considered in terms of the Meech Lake Accord's failure. The BCNI points out 
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that the doubt and uncertainty created by the inability of the provinces and Otta;wa to 
.resolve the Accord's impasse will inevitably result in. a decrease of investment within 
Canada. as well as a drop in economic growth and incomes.-i8 This situation is 
exacerbated in terms of Quebec since its monopoly capital fraction is mainly based on 
resources and manufacturing interests, both of which tend to .rely on foreign 
investment for finandn8 and export. markets. 
Furthermore, the international economic community's perception of the Meech 
Lake Accord conflict may result. in higher interest .rates, uncertainty about the 
Canadian dollar's stability an.d a decrease in foreign investment activity.i9 One 
wonden at how convincing the higher interest rates argument is since this is 
precisely one of the inducements by which foreign investment is attracted. It is 
important. to emphasize that the term foreign investment does not refer to the 
industrial infrastructure, per S8 , but rather to "futures investment", i.e., the sale of 
Treasury Bills by the federal government. Having high interest rates is an incentive 
for foreign investment in this respect. But higher interest rates and an unstable 
currency do diminish the opportunities Canadian multi-national firms have in making 
their own foreign investments. This is particularly crudal since aU interests within 
the monopoly capital fraction, i.e., resources, manufacturing, and finance have a 
common objective in Canadian multi-national investments abroad, A need for 
consensus between these monopoly capital fraction interests is also important since 
there is a high level of interdependency with regard to supporting Canadian foreign 
investment. 
Although the Meech Lake Accord was formulated to include Quebec in the 
Constitution by formally acknowledging its distinctiveness. to the members of the 
Business Council. the policy was merely a. mechanism to achieve economic stability and 
consensus. The monopoly capital fraction is concerned with the conflict between the 
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federal a.nd provincial echelons of the government only to t.he extent that it affects the 
group's consensus or hegemonic dominance. Cleuly, from the business interest 
group's point of view, the twin pillars of economics. ra.tionalfty and efficiency, must 
1.150 preva.il in the politica.! dialogue concerning the Meech Lake Accord: 
"The domina.nce of passion over reason. in the Meech Lake debate, and 
the preoccupa.tion with politics over economics. has made Canadians 
forget just how much we ha.ve a.ccompUshed together as a strong, stable, 
and unified country. "50 
One of the recent concerns that the Business Council has induded in its policy 
scope is the issue of environmental protection. Wha.t is in.terestin.g to note a.bout this 
puticulu policy is tha.t, unlike the other ones discussed thus fu, it does not contribute 
to the monopoly ta.pita.! fraction's unity or hegemonic domina.nce. Ra.ther, the 
recognition of this policy concern has been forced upon the business interest group's 
membership by the highly successful but sometimes unconventional lobbying 
activities of the grass-roots based Greenpeace orga.nization (among others) and. 
subsequently, by the public's growing awareness that environmental protection must 
be included on ihe government's policy-setting agenda. 
The Business Council's forma.! acknowledgement of the need to study 
environmeata.! protection came on May 15, 1989 when the interest group announced it 
would be establishing a task force on t.he environment and the economy. 51 According 
to BeNI President and CEO. Thomas d'Aquino: 
"Success in building an environmentally sustainable economy wiU come 
only through co-operation and consultation among all groups. The 
business community wiU be seeking more opportunities to work with 
others in developing appropriate policies and practices. "52 
The twenty-five member task force's cha.irperson is Scotia McLeod Inc. President, Tom 
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Iierans, who also chaired the "Energy Options Committee" sponsored by the Federal 
Energy Department in 1988.53 The committee's suggemons concentra.ted on the 
development of non-renewable resources while simultaneously emphasizing 
environmental protection. At first. glance, these two policy mandates seem 
co.o.tra.dictory, especially si.o.ee environmental protection is more likely achieved or 
enhanced through the development and production of renewable energy sources. But 
to such BCN! members as Imperial Oil Limited. Shell Canada Limited, and TransCa..o.ada 
since these are what their production capabilities and hegemonic dominance are based 
on. Using a similar framework. of objectives. the Business Council Task. Force on the 
Environment wiU study national as weU as inter.nationld regulatioDs and incentives to 
compose a "practical report" ('sk ) that can be a "basis of a.ctio.o." for the business 
community.54 
The framework through which members of the BeNI interprets environmental 
protection policy is economics: 
"We try to look. for the sort of horizontal environment issues that are 
going to be of concern to business in general. The cost of compliance. 
for example. The extent to which the government should be relying on 
market-based instruments versus command and control regulatory 
regimes or trying to improve the quality of the environment.";S 
Implicit in this assumption is the dassical1iberal concept of " Ja.issez-liIire ". Notice 
how Finlayson's approach to protection of the environment does not emphasize a moral 
or normative stance on business' contribution to the solution. Rather. the resolution of 
the problem is based upon a. cost feasibility assessment. This is a common objective 
through which aU the interests of the monopoly capital fraction can be brought 
together. Can there be a balance between environmental and economic interest.!?56 
Will the implementatioll (If an envirollmental protection policy by the state necessarily 
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worsen Canada's deteriorating industrial competitiveness?;? Recall that the raiSOJ1 
d'4irf1of the Free Trade Agreement was to expand the market in which American and 
Canadian businesses could compete on a "level playing field" without such "obstacles" 
as tariffs or provincial subsidies favouring non-monopoly capital fradions. Canadian 
capitaHsts may see a tougher environmental policy (and the direct and indirect costs of 
compliance) as a barrier to competing on equal terms with U.S. and other foreign 
producers, whose governments do not have such stringent environmental policies. 
The policy perspective through which the BeNI approaches protection of the 
environment is recognition of the problem and also the trade-offs that will have to be 
incurred. Basically, there are two trade-off,: cost and time.56 The element of cost 
translates into environmental protection requirements being borne by consumers. 
Bob Page, Chairman of the Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, an independent 
group that advises the federal Environment Ministry, says: 
"Business has been slow off the mark in addressing pollution concerns. 
The impact of the environment on companies' earnings has prompted a 
.recent surge in corporate environmentalism."59 
This is the same argument the Business Council uses for its endorsement of the Goods 
a.nd Services Tax. i.e., it supports cutting the deficit so long as the policy does not cut 
into profits. 
Cost may also be an incentive. particularly to the .resource and manufacturing 
interests of the monopoly capital fraction, to seek government subsidies or tax 
expenditures in terms of research and development. In other 'Words, the interests of 
monopoly capital inevitabJy lead to an increase of the state's accumulation and 
legitimation functions. Recall James O'Connor's "fiscal crisis of the state" argument. 
summarized in Chapter Three. that the rise of the state's activities means a cause of 
increased growth for the monopoly sector as more of the costs. but not the benefits of 
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accumulation, are shifted to the non-monopoly sector and the working class. Finally, 
cost may also be a way in which monopoly capital keeps its hegemonic dominance over 
the non-monopoly fractions since it is more capable of paying without sacrifici.ng 
much profit. As with the Free Trade Agreeme.nt, hegemonic dominance occurs only 
through competition a.nd elimi.nation of subordinate fractions. 
The second trade-off to be made. if an environmental protection policy is 
implemented, is time. Here the monopoly capital fraction argues that the expectations 
of those who demand and regulate environmental protection must not be drastic and 
immediate, but rather incremental and gradual. The new reality involves giving 
industry ample opportunity to readjust from the standards of yesterday to the standards 
of today. For example, state regulatory alencies may have to lower their expectations 
while big business "catches up" and becomes "environment friendly". In this context, 
another important legitimation function of the state is resolving intergovernmental 
conflict, I.e., between federal and provincial regulatory agencies, regarding the 
formulation and implementation of a co-cordinated environmental protection policy. 
The need for intergovernmental consensus and unity from t.he pe..rspective of the BeN! 
will be elaborated on in the foUowing chapter. 
The state is more inclined to act this way, i.e., to give industry plenty of lead 
time to adjust its technology and methods of production to being "environment 
friendly", towards the monopoly capital fraction simply because it. has a larger vested 
interest in maintaining the slJUus fUO towards accumulation and legitimation. Big 
business advocates a. long-term focus towards formulating and implementing a policy 
on the environment which is agreeable to a11 (but not necessarily to the same extent): 
"Industry, government., labour, environmen.tal groups and consumers 
will sit together to hammer out first an understanding and then a modus 
vivendi for making suitable development a reality. "60 
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The purpose of this chapter has been to summarize and analyze the policy scope 
of the BCNI. It has shown how the author's neo-Marxist paradi,m on business-
government relations can be applied to the interests of the monopoly capital fraction 
in maintaining consensus and hegemonic dominance. The horizontal policy concerns 
of the Business Council are seared towards providinl agreement because they do not 
antagonizi/ or polarize one sector aaainst another as may happen among the non-
monopoly capita.i fractionS. Rather, the orga.nization seeks to coalesce the interests of 
its membership.61 The next chapter analyzes h.OY the interests of the monopoly capita.1 
fraction are communicated to the state, a.nd the various stages of the policy process in. 
which the BeNI intervenes so that the "business interest" becomes synonymous with 
the" public interest". 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE BeNI AND THE STATE 
The previous chapters have dealt with the structure and policy scope of the 
Busi.ness Cou.nell a.n Natio.nal Issues and their respective roles in maintaining 
agreement and unity amongst its members, while simultaneously perpetuating the 
hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction ris-II.-ris the non-monopoly 
capital fractions. The final level of analysis in applying the author's neo-Marxist 
paradigm of business-government relations is to examine the process of interaction 
between the state and the interest group. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the 
various stages in the policy process at which the Business Council seeks to intervene to 
make the It general business interest" synonymous with the" public interest" . 
The specific branches of the state that wiU be discussed here are the senior 
levels of the civil service and the Cabinet. GenerallY, neo-Marxist literature on the 
functions of the state suggests that the state serves to establish a common concun of 
key fractions of capital, thereby maintaining hegemonic dominance through policies 
of accumulat.ion and legitim.iza.tion. However. the author's business-government 
relations paradigm proposes that this role is performed not by the state or the public 
service but by the It parallel burea.ucra.cy" of the BeNI. The Business Council can be 
categorized as a. "semi-state" orga.nization with respect to its functions of promoting 
policies which instil a sense of agreement and unity amongst. its members as well as 
maintaining the hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction. Its internal 
structure shares similar attributes with the civil service with respect to being a "non-
partisan", permanent organization with knowledgeable staff. financial resources, and 
an objective which promotes the "general business interest" in terms of the" national 
interest" in its policy initiatives. 
Consequently, the BCN! occupies a position somewhere between civil society a.nd 
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the state as it is usuaHy discussed in neo-Mar:dst literature. Thus far, the analysis is 
quite similar to LangiUe's discourse on the business interest group.l But. as pointed out 
in the previous two chapters, some of LangiUe's supporting arguments tend to be 
general. misleading, and arbitrary simply because his analysis depends too heavUy on 
the state's accumulation functioa. At times, this economic determinism implicitly 
argues that the Business CouacH has usurped the state's function of ma.inwaing 
accumulation. for the mon.opoly capital fraction. 
Like many neo-Marxist theorists. Langille does not discuss extensively the 
state's other equally important fun.ction of legitimization. In this context. 
legitimization refers not only to being respoasive to particular concerns under the 
"public interest" I'~ but also avoiding conflict. As the following discussion 
illustrates, the Business Council relies on Ottawa to resolve aay possible 
iatergovernmental conflict with the provinces in terms of formulating and 
implementing policies which are advantageous to the monopoly capital fraction. 
Recent literature pertaining to the study of public policy argues that by 
examining the public policy process, we can discover hoy these policies a.re 
manifested.2 By studying the actions, assumptions, perceptions. and strategies of the 
various players Un this instance. the business interest group and the civil service), the 
level of analysis can reveal how these broader concepts affect the policy process 
specifically. For instance, Langille postulates that rather than responding to 
government policy initiatives, the Business Council often assumes the role of actually 
setting the state's policy agenda.3 As mentioned earlier, it is important to remember 
that the state cannot be seen as an overt mechanism of monopoly capital dominance by 
the other fractions and classes. Capitalist policy concerns regarding accumulation and 
legitimation, i.e., social cohesion, consensus, and fra.ctional dominance, must be 
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translated by the state into hegemonic projects. It is the process by which the 
concerns of the "general business interest" arE! translated into the "pubUc interest" 
that will be the framework of this chapter. Specifically, how is it that the interaction 
between the BeNI and the civil service is translated into policies tha.t uphold the 
monopoly capitalist sl8iIlS quo under the public interest filfade? 
IDEMTlfYII8'iHE KEY PLAYERS 
La.ng.i11e argues that the trend to having capital concentrated to a small and elite 
gTOUp. i.e .. the monopoly capital fraction, has reflected a paraUel shift of power to the 
state's executive bra.nches,~ Why has there been an analogous shift of power within 
the structures of capital and the state? The author's neo-Mar:!dst paradigm of business-
government relations might be able to extend the level of analysis. from the 
perspective of the business interest group and the state. As mentioned in Chapter 
Three, flatow and Huisken contend that the state should be discussed in terms of 
uniting the fractiona.l interests of bourgeois society by their common concern for 
capital accumUlation, alongside and occasionally contrary to their particular interests. 
If this propOSition is applied to a business interest group, such as the BeNt the 
organization must have the ability to unite its members' interests, simply because 
maintainin.g hegemonic dominan.ce is dependent upon creatin.g internal consensus. 
Furthermore. because of the concentration of capital within the monopoly fraction, 
whose interests are represen.ted by the Business Council, this fraction has a greater 
stake in perpetuating the ststllS qllo to reflect accumulation and legitimation than do 
the competing and splintered interests of the non-monopoly capital fractions. 
From the perspective of the state, the concentration of power within the upper 
echelons of the civil service and the Cabinet may indicate that these two branches are 
the most responsible for formulating and implementing policies under the "public 
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i.nterest" fBfade. Subsequently, the analogous concentrations of power in Canadian 
monopoly capital and the state's executive may be necessary to provide a common 
perspective concerning the state's policy agenda-setting process.; Moreover, this shift 
of power to the state's executive is evident in that t.he Business Council focuses its 
interactions with the stratesic levels of the state: 
"We're trying to influence the sort of broad direction of government 
policy and so our efforts at the advocacy level are really targeted at the 
political level, and also at. the most senior bureaucratic level--the Deputy 
Ministers, the Assistant Deputy Ministers .. , we try to focus mainly on the 
most senior levels of government. "6 
Identifying the key players in this respect is a useful beginning, but as the 
author stresses, it is not enough to assume such a relationship exists merely by 
pointing out that the busi.ness mterest group and officials of the state interact. The 
analysis must be extended to include how the group's interactions within the policy 
process guarantee capital accumulation and legitimation of monopoly capital 
hegemonic dominance. 
THE PRE-POLICY STAGE 
Throughout his discourse on the a.ctivities between the BeNl and the Ca.nadian 
state, LangiUe emphasizes: tha.t the interest group a.ttempts to set the general 
framework for policy concerns.7 Clearly, by setting the state's poUcy agenda. the 
Business Council hopes that the concerns of its members wiU eventual1y be translated 
into the state's future hegemonic projects. It is imperative that the monopoly capital 
fraction express its concerns to the state. What is salient to note in this context, is the 
time frame involved between when the business interest group starts to articulate its 
members' concerns and the point at. which the state formally acknowledges these 
issues by placing them on the policy-setting agenda. Recall the previous cha.pter's 
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discussion on the "far-sighted" discourses the Business Council has given on 
competitive international trade. reform of the Canadian taxation system, the 
importance of maintaining a common market with Quebec irrespective of its future 
status in the Canadian Constitution, and creating an efficient economy while protecting 
the environment. Equally important, t.he state must acknowledge the salience of these 
issues by placing them near the top of the policy-setting agenda: 
" ... in a sense, we Ire trying to influence it H.e., the policy process} and 
have some impact on the government's own selection or priorities, 
rather than what the legislation is going to say. So it's almost a stage 
prior to the normal policy process in a way. It's trying to shape the 
overall agenda. "8 
One of the structures through which the BeN! attempts to influence the state's policy 
directions i$ the Priorities and Planning Committee. 
The Priorities and Planning Committee (P&P Committee) can be described as an 
"inner Cabinet". chalred by the Prime Minister, which sets the policy agenda for other 
sectoral committees.9 In January 1989, the Mulroney Administration created a new 
Cabinet Committee system which was designed to be more streamlined and focused 
towards specific policies.10 There are two points of interest regarding the changes. 
First is the creation of the Economic Policy Committee, whose mandate is to formulate 
policies conducive to assisting Canadian industries to become more competitive and take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the Free Trade Agreement. The Cabinet's 
Environment Committee is responsible for ensuring that government initiatives, 
policies, and programs support the government's objectives. Notice that these two 
specific Cabinet Committees are almost identical to the BCN!', "horizontal" 
international trade and economic issues and environment issues in terms of policy 
scope. This may further explain the process through which monopoly capital concerns 
are translated into policy initiatives by the state. 
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Second, the Communications Committee of cabinet is responsible for making 
sure that government policy and program initiatives are effectively communicated to 
the public and the overall program of the government is presented coherently. 1 t A 
useful illustration within this context is the Mulroney Administration's recent million 
doUar "flyer" campaign to educate Canadian householders about our country's new 
economic plan and how such policies as the Free Trade Agreement, the OST, reducing 
the deficit, controlling inflation by maintaining high interest rates. and eJ:panding job 
skills training are integral to the governmen.t's policy direction.. The Federal-
Provincial Relations Committee. whose activities are closely lin.ked to the 
Communications Committee, is equally important to the legitimation function. of the 
tabin.et.. 
The raison d'ltre of the P&P Committee is to survey the entire process of 
financial planning and activities of the co-ordinating committees (e.g .. 
communications. federal-provincial relations). standing committees (e.g., expenditure 
review, economic policy), and ad 110c committees (tax reform) towards "fiscal 
restraint". Recall from the previous chapter's discussion that such terms as "fiscal 
restraint" and "fisca.l responsibility" are creeds on which the state bues its polity 
formulation and implementation. The creeds simultaneously address the concerns of 
capital to reducing the deficit., thereby lowering interest rates and stimulating 
indust.rial investment. Another important consideration in this respect is that the 
interests of the Bus.in.ess Council are identical to the concerns addressed by the 
Priorities and Planning Committee: 
"We start wit.h our own agenda, what our four, five, or six priorities are 
for the coming six months or a year, and we work from that script. The 
Priorities and Planning Committee is meetingiater this month [August] 
to decide on the 'Autumn Agenda'. Our ultimate goal is to try and 
influence the basic choices that would be made at that very early stage. 
awl U"s almost fof' us Ii question of tryinl to inOueAce their 
buic thiatiAI about Yh.at theii" priorities yilt be , quite a.part 
and prior to trying to influence the content of any specific 
le,i51ation. "12 
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There are tvo points of interest that can be discussed in reference to the PM> 
Committee that also pertain to the author's neo-Mar:list paradigm of business-
government relations. First, the priorities of the BCNI can be seen as a "policy die" that 
is used to shape or form the state's policy agenda. This supports the contention of the 
form and functions theorists, discussed in Cha.pter Three. that the state is reactive to 
dass conflict within capitalism. The state does not have the ability of being 
dairroyut regarding class conflict and planning its appropriate form and function. 
Ra.ther. it rea.cts to class conflict. or in the case of the Business Council. reflects 
policies that will maintain the monopoly capital fraction's hegemonic dominance. The 
Planning and Priorities Committee also shows .hOY the state acknowledges "'hich 
specific interests it will accommodate in policy formulation and implementation. In 
the case of the BCNt both the business interest group a.nd the state have paraHel policy 
agendas which facilitate accumulation and iegitimation of monopoly capita.!'s 
hegemonic dominance. 
Second. the P&P Committee represents a source of legitimation. i.e .. being 
responsive to the "public interest" and bringing about consensus regarding concerns 
of the business interest group in the state's policy formulation and implementation 
functions. As the discussion in the previous chapter iUustrates, the interactions 
between the BCNI and the government that ensure consensus through appropriate 
policies are not limited to the Federal echelon per SIll, but also include the Provincial 
governments. Part of this chapter focuses on the Business Council's concern that both 
Ottawa and the Provinces reach a consensus on joint implementation of the Goods and 
Services Tax and an Environmental Protection Policy. These hi-lateral policy 
negotiations attempt to ensure that the" general business interest" is maintained under 
116 
the auspices of the "public interest." f8fu~. The discussion now concentrates on how 
the Business Council tries to articulate its members1concerns through the state's policy 
formulation and implementation. 
POLICY FORMULATION 
q At't'tMIL4~ 
All business interest groups attempt to influence the state's formulation of 
policies which wi11 be conducive to accumulation. This tacit knowledge is a common 
objective that binds such different organaat.ions as the Business Council on National 
Issues an.d the Canadian Federation of Independent Business. What separates them is 
how effectively each group is able to achieve this objective with its interactions with 
the state. Our discussion in Chapter Four suggests than an "institutionalized" interest 
group such as the BeNI interacts frequently with Cabinet Ministers and senior 
members of the civil service while communication with the state by a If fledgling" 
interest group such as the crIB can. best be described as somewhat erratic and 
confrontational. One argument that can be put forward to explain the different 
strategies each group uses is derived from the perspective of state monopoly capitalism. 
Reca.11 the premise of this neo-Marxist paradigm is that. the state's activities 
accommoda.te the exclusive concerns of the monopoly capital fraction at the expense of 
non-monopoly capital fractions. What is important to emphasize at this point is t.hat 
only selected officials of the state are involved in this process. 
Ra.1ph Miliband, in his nea-Ma.nis! instrumental writings. (which are discussed 
in Cha.pter Three), contends that the state's structure is not. monolithic but is divided 
into various branches such as the executive, the legislature. crown corporations. 
regulatory agencies. the police, the army, courts, and sub-national governments (i.e., 
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Provincial and MunicipaU. The executive, which includes the Cabinet. and the upper 
echelons of the public service. and the Legislature are the focus of our current 
discussion. The fore-mentioned dichotomy exists because the executive and 
administrative apparatus of the state monopolize the functions of poUcy formulation 
and implementation. It is precisely for this reason that a group such as the Business 
Council must communicate its members' interests at the early stages of public policy-
making. As noted previously, once the policy reaches the legislative branch of the 
state, it is "cast in stone" and impervious to all but minor changes. Maintaining the 
capitalist sl8tus quo to reflect the interests of monopoly capital is not dependent on 
minor technical changes in policies. 
What is interesting to note in the emmple of the BCNI is that even within the 
state's executive, the organization is selective as to the specific ministries and 
departments it strategically targets. Consequently, it focuses its interactions on 
individual ministries and departments that wiU articulate the membership's interest in 
the form.u1a.tion of appropriate policies. For e:mmple, Finlayson says the Business 
Council's "network." with the Canadian state "encompasses aU the Fede.ra1 Agen.cies and 
Departments. all Cabinet Ministers, and chairmen of various Parliamenta,ry 
Committees,"13 However. 1a.ter on in the discussion, finlayson qualifies this assertion 
by suggesting that the BeNI's contact with the state is limited in scope to those specific 
Departments which have the most potential in formulating polities that refled the 
four "horAzonta.1 issues of concerns" discussed in the previous chapter: 
" ... We probably spend more of our time with dealing, interacting with 
the senior economic departments in government. nam.ely finance. 
Industry, Science and Technology, External Affain and International 
Trade, Consumer and Corporate Affairs. Central Aleaciel th.at are 
lave!ved in the pelic)" .1"OCOO. no~ly. t.ho Privy CoUAeU 
Offico .. .finance of course, includes tax policy which is done within the 
Depa.rtment. of finance. Revenue Canada is really just the collection arm 
for taxes, We don't deal with them very extensively, We deal.oN Oil 
H.rt of .Bacn.treeBealtre alld tax issuos yith the fiAlUltree 
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hpU'tll.eAt. " i i 
The various Departments of the government that finlayson mentions are aU 
crucia.l to the Business Council's on-going dwogue with senior politicia.ns a.nd 
burea.ucrats. The articulation of the business interest group's concerns to certain key 
departments within the government and the civil service ensure that future policies 
are advantageous to monopoly capital. For example, the formulation of a bH.atenl 
trade agreement between the United States a..nd Canada must be a co-ordinated effort 
bet'Ween the Department of Fina..nce, 'Which includes the Canadian Import. Tribunal an.d 
the Tariff Board, Externa.l Affairs, which includes the Export Development Corporation 
and is directly linked to International Trade, and Consumer and Corporate Affairs. 
'Which includes the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. Similarly, proposed 
reforms to Canada.'s taxation system, such as the 6ST. must involve the Department of 
Finance in policy formulation. Notice that Finlayson emphasizes that Revenue Canada 
is involved only in the implemen.tation of the Goods and Services Tax. The Business 
Council's interactions with the Department of Industry, Science and Technology might 
provide important input for an Environmental Protection Policy that is economically 
feasible for monopoly capital. 
Finlayson also stresses the pivotal role of the Depa.rtment of finance in terms of 
macroeconomic and ta.x issues. Recall that. macroeconomic issues include the inflation 
rate and exchange rates. However. Finlayson says that members of the BCNI Policy 
CommiU4:1e meet 'With John Crowe, The &.nk of Canada's Governor, "less extensively 
than 'With some of the other departments." 15 In terms of formulating policies 
advantageous for the monopoly capital fraction. the BeNI's interaction with the 
Department of Finance as opposed to The Bank of Canada. is rational. The Bank of 
Canada faUs under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance. Moreover. literature 
pertaining to the budgetary process indicates that prior to tabling the budget in the 
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Legislature. the Minister of Finance will consult with the Governor of The Bank of 
Canada..l b For example, if the policy direction of the budget is one of controUing 
inflation. the budget's objectives may include streamlining or cutting government 
programs. 11lcreasing or proposing new wes such as the GST in order to cut the deficit 
and maintaining high interest rates to curb spendi.J1g by both businesses and 
consumers. What is interesting is that high interest rates also support the will of the 
monopoly capital fraction to be hegemonically dominant by reducing the probability 
of new non-monopoly capital industries being established and thereby eliminating 
competition from other fractions. High interest rates also accommodate the needs of 
the foreign investment sector of the monopoly capital fradion. 
Finlayson also mentions the importance of dealing with Central Agencies that 
are involved in the policy process such as the Privy Council Office (pro). This point 
merits further discussion. The Privy Council Office is a small organization which 
offers policy advice and administrative assistance to the Prime Minister, to Cabinet as a 
whole. and to Cabinet Committees'!? Although the PCO is analogous to the PMO's 
function in providing policy advice to elected officials, the Privy Council Office is 
staffed by senior public servants rather than political appointees. The organization of 
the PCO is such that each Cabinet Committee (with the exception of the Treasury Board 
which maintains its own Secretariat) has a civil servant appointed as a Secretariat from 
the PrivyCoundl Office) 8 
The responsibUities of each Cabinet Committee Secretariat include overseeing 
the general policy environment of the Committee as well as uvisinl Oft Dey ,0Ucy 
iaitiativos.19 The PCO's salient role in policy formulation makes it an invaluable 
component in the BCNI's communication network with the state, Its participatory role 
in monitoring the general policy environment of each Cabinet Committee means that 
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the concerns of the Business Council's membership are articulated to the nerve centres 
of power within the state and will be fonvarded by the PCO Secretariat to the 
appropriate Department and Ministries over which each Committee has responsibility. 
The Privy Council Office's role of "late beper" means that only certain concerns, 
namely those that perpetuate the stBtus quo for the monopoly capital fraction, will be 
placed on the policy-setting agenda. This" gate keeper" function of the civil service is 
analogous to Claus Ofte's "hierarchical system of filters" or Bachrach and Barat,t's 
concept of "non decision.-makin.g." The PCO's function also substantiates the author's 
contention that the civil service maintalns a domin.ant position within the state 
because of its permanen.ce rris-a.-rris politicians an.d its monopoly on expertise, 
knowledge and information. Our model also emphasizes the significance of the state 
formulatmg policies which help to legitimize 01" bring about consensus of other 
fractions and classes to the hegemonic dominance of monopoly capital. The discussion 
now turns to how the state's legitimation role reflects the BeNI', interests. 
II) J.SilTlllAllON 
RecaU that we define the state '51 legitimation fUlu::tions to include the civil 
service's ability of being responsive to monopoly capital's needs under t.he "public 
interest" I'~. The Business Council IS concern over the general direction taken by 
the federal budget, i.e., whether it promotes or diminishes the interests of the 
organization's members, wiU be induded in the analysis. The foUowing discourse 
highlights the additional legitimation function of the federal government in 
eliminating any potential sources of conflict with its provincial counterparts 
regarding policy formulation. 
The objective of any public policy. induding a financial one like the budget. is 
attempting to bring about consensus a.mongst various, sometimes conflicting, needs. 
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The state must have the ability to be responsive to the diversified needs of society. The 
budget, by extension. is a financial expression of the state's legit.imation function. This 
is of particular relevance to the monopoly capital fraction since the budget's overall 
direction often perpetuates the fraction's hegemonic dominance in the "public 
interest" . Indeed. one may even classify the annual Federal budget as part of what 
Jessop terms a "hegemonic project". Finlayson elaborates within this context: 
"We're very con cerned with the direction set down by the budget every 
year. That's probably the central document that's produced by the 
Feden.1 government that we're most concerned about on a year to year 
basis. It's the budget. the fiscal plan that's laid out, the basic kind of 
economic philosophy and direction the government's going to take, the 
key economic policy areas for priority action within the year, the 
eT.rall question with the tax system aad the tax hurdea. "20 
Notice how Finlayson equates the Federal budget with the general fiscal 
direction the government will undertake and specifically the tax system and the W 
burden (read: who benefits from t.he 80vernment.'s policy and who bears the cost?). A 
800d illustration of this point is the federal government's proposed Goods and Services 
Tn:, RecaU from the previous chapter that the GST is part of the government's 
initiative to lower the deficit by broadening the t.u base. The GST also creates a more 
fair and competitive taxation system by implementing a tax that is applicable 
universally to all provinces while simultaneously eliminating the archaic "hidden" 
Manufacturer's Sales Tax CMS!). But our analysis also points out how the aST maintains 
the hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction by acting as a policy 
buttress to the Free Trade Agreement. The Free Trade Agreement was designed to 
enhance the accumulation of monopoly capital interests by extending access to 
international markets. High production levels mean not only increased profits but abo 
paying an increased MST, which is applied to exported manufactured goods, Not only 
does this lower the profit potential. for the manufacturing sector, it also makes" playing 
on a level field" more difficult for Canadian manufacturers, espedaUy with trading 
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partners which do not have a comparable tax. Clearly. the answer for the Business 
Council to this problem is to formulate a tax policy which "internalizes" the MST. 
thereby taxing the Canadian public so that the monopoly capital ma.nufacturing sector 
can be more efficient and productive. The aST is interpreted 1n terms of the "public 
interest" by equating the tax's revenue to reducing the Federa.l deficit. inflation. and 
interest rates. Furthermore. aU of these things wiU improve Canada's climate for 
investment and competition, but again these terms are narrowly defined to include 
only the interests of the monopoly capital fraction. 
As with formulating accumulation policies that mirror the interests of the 
monopoly capital fraction, wha.t is important to consider in the state's legitimation 
function is the time-frame involved and the strategic departments targeted, The 
Business Council on National Issues must articulate the concerns of its membership 
effectively so that their interests wiU be plated on the state's policy agenda weU ahead 
of the presentation of the budget to the House of Commons and be recognized as 
"legitimate" by officials involved in the budget's drafting. Within this context. 
Finlayson asserts: 
"'We really gear up in the Autumn to get our own economic issues on the 
agenda, to put some kind of economic position paper together on what we 
see as the critical economic issues facing Canada in the coming six 
months to one year period. And that will serve as our pre-budget 
submission and our attempt to influence the broader economic agenda. 
'We see the budget as the critical drivinl force of the economic agenda. so 
we teAd to focus on the Minister of FiAaace &Ad OD. the 
C.biD.et eo.althea iD.volved iD. ,uu.iD.1 the bud,et tolether 
01" the broad ouUine for the hudlot. "21 
There are two critical things to note in Finlayson's quotation. First, consider 
t.he significance placed on the sense of timing the business interest group uses to 
articulate its concerns for the upcoming budget. to the state. formuiating policies 
which reflect either the accumulation or legitimation functions of the state requires 
that the interest group articulate its concerns to the state far ahead in time to influence 
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the policy direction. This supports Mi1.iband's proposition that shaping the sllltus guo 
towards monopoly capital interests must be accomplished in the early stages of the 
policy process. Second. but equally important, note that the Department and Cabinet 
committees that function in terms of legitimation are exactly the same ones that 
maintain accumulation policies. This suggests that a business interest group such as 
the BCNI tends to express its needs, both for accumulation and legitimation of its 
hegemonic dominance, to the same strategic departments and personnel Through this 
interaction, the state aclmowledgEls the "general business interest" and makes it 
synonymous to the "public interest". The means by which the state recognizes 
particular interests within the structuralist paradigm of the relatively autonomous 
state also becomes less ambiguous, The co-ordinated functions of accumulation and 
legitimation by the Department of Finance and Cabinet Committees also support the 
view of form and functions of the state theorists that the capitalist state not only 
reflects but embodies conflict, Having a single state mechanism for both accumulation 
and le,itimation towards monopoly capital hegemonic dominance ensures that 
fractional and class conflict is minimal and k.ept under control. 
The Business Council is also concerned that. the interests it. expresses fot' the 
state to consider as future policy initiatives be equally accepted by the Federal and 
Provindallevels of government. A co~ordinated effort by both levels of government. 
ensures conflict of policy formulation as well as implementation is minimal,22 Thus, 
Finlayson states that once the business interest ,roup's constituency hu identified and 
agreed upon its priorities. the next step is to influence both the Federal and Provincial 
governments on these issues.23 Perhaps the most relevant e:!amples within this conte:!t 
are the coUapse of the Meech Lake Accord and the proposed Environmental Protection 
Policy, initiated by the federal governme.nt. 
The discussion of the Meech Lake Accord in Chapter Five poi.nted out that the 
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BCNI had hoped the Accord's ratification would usher in a new era of Canadian political 
and economic stabiHt.y. However, the Accord's collapse means that. the inherent 
political conflict between Ottawa and the Province of Quebec must be resolved in terms 
of maintaining a common market. Recall that the monopoly capital f.ra.ction's 
hegemonic dominance depends on its ability to maintain consenws and unity of 
membership. From the perspective of the Business Council's membership, the 
formulation of a post-Meech Lake Accord Policy between Ottawa and Quebec must focus 
on establishing a common market to maintain the cohesiveness of Canadian capital as 
'lieU as foreign investment interests. 
The legitimation function of the state is also crucial to resolving 
intergovern.mental conflict in the formulation of a co-oNin.ated En.vironmental 
Protection Policy. Fi.nlayson points out that the Fede.ra.l-Provincial overlap and 
potential for intergovernmen.tal conflict in the formulation of a.n. Environmental 
Protection Policy adds confusion and fear to the business interests being "over-
regulated" .24 The lack of a comprehensive and co-ordinated effort by both levels of 
government may result either in a policy "twilight zone" where Ottawa and the 
Provinces are unsure of each other's jurisdiction or in duplication of regulatory 
activities. The current argument between Ottawa and Saskatchewan over the proposed 
buHding of the controversial "Rafferty" dam is a perfect eu.mple of this 
intergovernment conflict. While the two echelons of government engage in a war of 
words. the long~term a.ccumulation interests of the monopoly resource sector are 
threatened since the water supply that the proposed dam will offer as a cooling pond 
for a power generation station is being dela.yed for an indeterminate amount of time. 
From the Business Council's point of view, the solu:tionto this policy formulation 
problem is: 
..... to caU for grea.ter clarification of jurisdictional responsibilities. the 
development of national standards wherever possible, and the creation 
of a 'one window' environmental review system to facilitate assessment 
and approval of economic development projects that faU under both 
Federal and Provincial jurisdiction."2S 
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This II one window" approach also ensures that both levels of government become 
aware of the monopoly capital fraction's interests and formulate a joint-Environmental 
Protection Policy that will accommodate accumulation and hegemonic dominance. 
While it is important for the state to acknowledge the concerns of the monopoly capital 
fraction by placing them on the policy-setting agenda in terms of formulation. the 
state's function of equating the" general business interest" to the" public interest" also 
extends to implementation. The next section examines how this is accomplished in 
terms of resolvi.ng intergovernmental conflict regarding policy implementation. 
POUCY IMPLEMENT AIION 
Recent literature on business-govern.o'uult relations points out that a major 
source of conflict between interest groups and the state is in. the realm of 
interprovincial rivalries which the implementation of a Federal policy might create or 
elacerbate.26 As with the formulation stage of public policy, intergovernmental 
conflict ma.kes it more difficult to make the "general business interest" synonymous 
with tb.e If public interest". The following presents a brief discussion of tb.e 
legitimation function of the state in terms of establishing Provincial agreement 
regarding the Free Trade Agreement and the Goods and Services Tal. Remember that a 
significant part of the state's legitimation function in this context is havini the 
Federal and Provincial governments support the interests of monopoly capital 
implicitly through policy implementation. 
The formulation and implementation of the Free Trade Aireement maintained 
the status fUO for the monopoly ca.pital fraction by broadening the accessibility to 
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international markets. The implementation of the bi-lateral trade agreement also 
threatened the protection provincial subsidies created for non-monopoly capita! 
fractions. The monopoly capital fraction argued that interprovincial subsiwes to smaU 
and medium-sized businesses in "have not" provinces merely created "inefficient" 
competition vis-i#.-yis other businesses and furthermore, served to exacerbate Canadian 
regionalism. In advocating the Free Trade Agreement's formulation and subsequent. 
implementation. the BCNI is equa.ting the" general business interest" with the "pubUc 
interest" . Thus, accumulation and hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital 
fraction i'll"e legitimized by the state into a policy which ostensibly provides a more 
competitive. efficient market and lower consumer prices on imported goods. 
It is misleading to suggest. that the interactions of the Business Council with the 
civil service and/or Cabi.net. Ministers are restricted to either just the formulation or 
the implementation of policies. Rather, it is an on-going activity by the BeNI to 
articulate its membership's concerns from the pre-policy stage to policy 
implementation. Wit.hin this context. Finlayson says: 
" ... and that is a frequent pattern here. It's happened with the Cuada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement where we supported the policy decision to 
negotiate a Free Trade Agreement and subsequently, we supported the 
actual agreement. The Goods and Services Tax is another example. We 
very strongly supported the concept of a national value added tax a.nd 
pushed the government very hard to institute such a tax. They produced 
the Goods and Services TM: proposal. We had some problems with the way 
it was drafted and then tried to influence it in the subsequent months. 
We were involved both in the sort of pre-policy decision stage and 
subsequently, in trying to have some impa.ct on the content of the policy 
as it evolved over time."21 
What is interesting to note in the above quotation is that Finla.yson mentions the 
Free Trade Agreement and the OST in the same breath, the implica.tion being that the 
two policies are closely linked. A plausible argument can be made that the 
implementation of the Free Trade Agreement maintained the hegemonic dominance of 
the monopoly ca.pital fraction but not without cost to its members. With broader a.ccess 
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to the United States market (and, possibly Mexico), the monopoly capital manufacturing 
sector was able to increase the level of exported Can.adian goods. However, this higher 
level of production also mean.t paying more Manufacturer's Sales Tu, a federal tal 
added onto exported goods. Non-monopoly capital fractions. i.e., small and medium-sized 
businesses in the manufacturing sector escaped this tax since their merchan.dise was 
geared mainly towards the domestic market. Clearly. the implementation of the Free 
Trade Agreement would be self-defeating to the accumulation interests of the monopoly 
capital. fraction if it had to pay a higher Man.ufacturer's Sales Tax. In this instance, the 
implementation of one policy was the impetus for the development. of another. 
However, the two policies diverge on the Federal government's legitimation 
function. i.e., bringing about consensus between the Provinces by the implementation 
of the OST. Consequently, Ottawa is not only having difficulty justifying the GST to 
Canadians in terms of being responsive to the "public interest", it is hindered in the 
successful universal implementation of the tal: by the Provinces. Some Provinces have 
decided to incorporate the GST and the Provincial Sales Tu into a single combined tax. 
Other Provinces have chosen to "piggy back" their respective Provincial Sales Tax on 
top of the merchandise an.d the GST. The problem is made more acute in this context 
since both monopoly and non-monopoly fractions will have to deal with a two-tier 
taxation system. 
CONClUSIONlSUYMNW 
Figure 6.1 represents a graphic portrayal of the author's neo-Marxist paradigm 
of business-government relations, .reflecting important amendments which a.re 
discussed in this chapter. It is identical to our preliminary model aU but two 
respects. 
The first .revision made to the original model is the inclusion of the Privy 
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Council Office as a. ma.jor force in policy formulation. This is because the Privy Council 
Office's personnel are senior civil servants who are appointed to be Secretariats of the 
various Cabinet Committees. Two of their most fundamental responsibilities are to 
"suggest" policy initiatives and to monitor the policy agenda of each Cabinet 
Committee. Essentially, the position of Secretariat in this context is that of a "gate 
keeper" regarding what issues are and are not considered in policy formulation. 
Consequently, BeNI interaction with members of the PCO is crucial to ensuring that the 
interests of monopoly capital are included in the launching of new policy initiatives. 
Our discussion of the pro. however. should not preclude the Prime Minister's Office 
(PMO) as another important member of the BeNI's communication network with the 
Canadian state. The PMO functions uan "alternate bureaucracy" to which the Business 
Coun.cil can. articulate its membership's con.cerns. Recall that the BeNI', current 
President and CEO. Thomas d' Aquino, was part of the PMO for the Trudeau 
Administration between 1969-1972. and knows its internal operations well. 
The second change evident in the revised paradigm lies in the recognition of 
interactions between. members of the BeNI and the Federal Cabinet.. These interactions 
serve two purposes in translating the interests of monopoly capital into the "public 
interest". First. in the policy formulation stage, the BeNI presents its concerns to 
Cabinet Ministers u weU as the Planning and Priorities Committee so that both the 
business interest group and the government will have parallel policy agendas. We 
have noted that certain Departments such as Finan.ce an important not only to the 
accumulation but also to the legitimation component of policy formulation. Thus, for 
elample, the involvement of the Department of Finance in articulating monopoly 
capital concerns in the formulation of accumulation polities is extended to the 
formulation of such legitimation policies as the budget. Interaction with elected 
officials from both Ottawa and the Provinces is also prevalent in the formulation and 
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implementation of policies. An example of b:r.inging a.bout. consensus between the two 
echelons of government to reflect. the concerns of big business is the formulation of a 
dear a.nd co-ordinated Environmental Protection Policy. With regards to policy 
implementation, the Federal government attempts to resolve or minimize 
intergovernmental conflict. or interprovincial :r.ival:r.ies. The coUapse of the Meech 
Lake Accord and the implementation of the GST are two prominent examples in this 
context. 
The introduct.ion of this chapter focused on how the author's paradigm of 
business-government relations was different from other neo-Marxist discourses in that 
it places a.n "institutionalized" interest group such as the BeNI between the realms of 
the state and civil society. The BeN! me:r.its this distinction since its structure and 
policy scope reflect a "parallel bureaucracy" to the civil service. Both are permanent. 
organizations whose power is based upon knowledge. expertise, and information. Both 
attempt to maintain consensus and unity through policies which reflect "the general 
business interest" and the "public interest", Often, the state's hegemonic projects 
serve as a /'6f1Jliq for policies that support accumulation and hegemonic dominance of 
the monopoly capital fraction. To minimize conflict with other fractions and classes, 
the Business Council often equates its interests with the "public interest". Thus. 
according to Jock Finlayson: 
"We tend to look at these horizon.tal issues that have an effed on 
business and on the country as a whole. Beca.use of that, we like to think 
we 'n ca.pable to some extent of rising above the narrow interests of big 
business and making some sort of contribution to intelligent public 
policy debate. and intelUgent public policy conten.t at the nationa.11evel. 
and to a lesser extent at the Provincial level. "28 
To the extent that the BeNI is successful in equating its members' interests with "the 
public interest" and in influencing the policies of the formal executive branch of the 
state. it may be viewed as a vital agency in the performance of the state's accumulation 
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and legitimation functions, since the "relatively autonomous" state is thereby enable to 
acknowleda8 and accommodate the interests of the monopoly capital fraction while 
simultaneous!'y appearing to transcend the class and fraction.al conflicts of civil society. 
FIGURE 6.1 
fljA REVISED NEO-MARXIST PARADIGM 
Of BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. III 
Civil Service II controls power within the state 
e functions as reiatively autonomous i.nstitution via 
D maintaining/perpetuating "national interest" 
-legitimation (through neutrality! 
responsiveness fljflUle), 
Legitimation '" consensus 
H) capitalist accumulation via Deputment of 
Finance, Treasurj Board, National Bank, 
*PriTf Council Offiee·s R.le .f "Iliae 
keeper'" relardinl poUey foraulatie •. it 
*Prime Minister's Office functions as 
important "alternate burea.ucracy" regarding 
policy initiatives. * 
* Amendment to Author'S 
Business Council preliminary model"" Government 
on National Issues --------~-~->~. (invested with power) 
Jt\. 
• Attempts to. maintain 
hegemonic dominance 
of monopoly capital. 
I.e., resource, manu-
facturing, finance, and 
foreign investment 
concerns over 
competing fractional 
interests of non-
monopoly capital 
fractions. 
• Articulates and main-
tains a II general 
business interest" in 
its intera.ctions with the 
civil service to maintain 
consensus and cohesive-
ness among its members. 
" Interactions of BeNI with 
the government 
regarding Cabinet Ministers 
a.nd Planning and Priorities 
Committee. 
Ii Legitimation function in 
terms of consensus between 
Federal and Provincial 
governments reguding the 
formula.tion and implemen-
tation of policies . 
Jt\. 
It Controls conflict between 
dasses. 
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